W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1982

In the shadow of settled society: The safety valve in nineteenth
century American thought
John M. Coski
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Coski, John M., "In the shadow of settled society: The safety valve in nineteenth century American
thought" (1982). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625198.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-phqx-ww98

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

IN THE SHADOW OF SETTLED SOCIETY

4»

The Safety Valve in Nineteenth Century American Thought

A Thesis

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by
John M. Coski
1982

i

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

John M. Coski

Approved,

Edward P. Crapol

Richard B . Sherman

ii

DEDICATION

This thesis (replete with its passive constructions and
occasional lapses in reasoning) is dedicated to Dr. Arthur L. Tracy,
the apotheosis of a mentor and an educator.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION

.....................

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ABSTRACT

..............

..........................

FRONTIS P A G E ......... .'............
INTRODUCTION .............
CHAPTER

I.

CHAPTER

II.

CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER

iii

IV.

CONCLUSION.

v
vi

.

1

. . . . . . . . .

...

THE ORIGINS OF THE SAFETY VALVE ASSUMPTION

. .

2
4

THE SAFETY VALVE IN PUBLIC LAND POLICY. . . .

26

PRODUCERS VS. MONOPOLISTS

52

..........

THE SAFETY VALVE AND THE IDEOLOGY OF
M O B I L I T Y ............
THE NEW AMERICAN C A L C U L U S ............. .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .

..............

iv

89
108
115

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In an open-ended investigation of this nature, the most
important labor is the endless detective work. Although there
are, no doubt, stones still unturned, several friendly hints and
helping hands have proven especially valuable, and warrant special
thanks:
--Dr. Edward Crapol, who brought to my attention
the involvement of the Knights of Labor in land
reform;
--Dr. Marshall Bowen, who answered a plaintive call
for help with a cryptic clue that has proven to be
a goldmine;
--my eldest sister, Joannie Moses, who has been a
prompt and reliable long-distance research assistant.
What more could a brother want?
--Carol Linton and Swem Interlibrary Loan, whose efforts
account for many of this paper's primary sources; ILL
is undoubtedly the best friend that a researcher in
modern American history has in this bastion of Coloni
alism.
My profound debt of gratitude--trite as it may be— goes to
my wife, Ruth Ann, who has endured almost a year of unintelligible
mutterings and fidgeting while I waded through the proverbial "con
structive confusion." It is a tribute to her stoicism, patience,
and intelligence that she not only listened to my soliloquies, but
was often able to tell me what I was trying to say.

v

ABSTRACT

This is a study of nineteenth century opinion on the safety
valve doctrine, or the theory that the free (unoccupied) land of
America's public domain served as an outlet for eastern surplus
labor, and thus mitigated the negative side-effects of industrial
development. The safety valve was an assumption in nineteenth cen
tury thought and carried ideological connotations that modern
historical scholarship has neglected.
It is a premise of this work that the contemporary vision
of a safety valve is best understood by inductive analysis, rather
than by deductively imposing the historiographical definition onto
the nineteenth century context.
The study, therefore, begins with
a working definition of the safety valve as the relationship between
free western land and eastern socio-economic stability. A more
precise understanding of the safety valve is derived from its associ
ation with other ideas and events.
The origins of the safety valve concept can be clearly
found in the liberal traditions of classical economics and natural
rights. Abstract theories found specific application in the United
States, where broad expanses of public land and free republican
institutions encouraged Americans to view the safety valve as an
element of national uniqueness.
This thesis examines the sources, nature and impact of the
safety valve concept in three of its predominant post-Civil War con
texts:
the formulation of public land policy, labor reform, and
efforts to cope with urban overcrowding.
These are dealt with in
semi-independent chapters which pose identical questions and contri
bute to a common conclusion.
The most salient feature of contemporary opinion on the
safety valve was the contrast between its assumed or "natural" exist
ence and its actual ineffectiveness.
The attempts to cope with this
perceived paradox and its intellectual impact constitute the major
focus of the thesis.
In conclusion, because it was thought to be a key precondition
for American uniqueness and its eclipse a harbinger of the encroachment
of the "old World," the safety valve was, throughout the century, an
explanation, rationalization, or forecast of change.

. . . assumptions of full and free competition, which underlies this
self-protecting power of labor, is wholly gratuitous (for much of
the world’s population); but also that, when the mobility of labor
becomes in a high degree impaired, the reparative and restorative
forces do not act at all. On the contrary, a new and antagonistic
principle begins to operate, v i z ., the principle that to him that
hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away
the little that he seeraeth to have.
--Francis A. Walker, Political Economy,
1888

As no man can live without land, it follows that the man who owns the
land owns the lives of his fellow men.
--Elizabeth Bachman Brokaw in A r e n a , 1894

No league between employed and employer, however cordial and faith
fully carried out, could be of more than temporary benefit.
Only a
return to natural law, a scientific adjustment of the primal agents
in production, land and labor, and the restoration of him to his
natural environment, and freedom of action therein can effect any
salutory change.
--J. K. Ingalls, testifying before the
Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, 1883

We have struck our frontier.
The western wave of migration has
reached its limit, and the population has been obliged to recoil upon
itself.
From now on there will be no outlet for the unemployed and
the discontented of our cities.
The conditions of life will tend
to become more and more similar to those in western Europe . . .
--Walter Weyl, in an address to the
National Conference on Social Welfare,
1905

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine the place of the safety valve
V

concept in late nineteenth century intellectual life.

It was not

a formalized doctrine, but a variable concomitant of other social
or economic viewpoints.

There was, in other Words, no monolithic

safety valve; its exact sources and modus operandi depended largely
upon its application.

Similarly, the causes and consequences of

its ineffectiveness varied according to perspective.

Because of

this, each chapter of this paper will explore distinct contemporary
contexts of the safety valve and will constitute essentially selfcontained essays.

The chapters will, however, pursue a similar line

of inquiry, resting on the following questions about each application
of the safety valve:
valve?

What were the sources and benefits of the safety

How well did it supposedly function?

implications of its failure?

What were the perceived

What were the actual consequences of

this perception?
In all of its manifestations, there were several commonali
ties in the safety valve.

Foremost among these was the contrast

between its assumed validity and its perceived impotence.

The failure

to alleviate social and economic disorders accounted for most of
the attention the safety valve attracted throughout the century.
Consequently, the safety valve was used to explain events or develop
ments antithetical to American self-perceptions, promote sweeping
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reforms, or rationalize departures from American tradition.

Thus,

in the late nineteenth century intellectual milieu, the safety
valve carried a connotation of reluctant change.

Since the safety

valve was supposed to be a guarantor of values and self-perceptions,
such a connotation was especially ironic and significant.

CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF THE SAFETY VALVE ASSUMPTION

The safety valve doctrine rested on the conviction that
abundant free land carried beneficial effects for the maturing
American society.

More specifically, the doctrine postulated a re

lationship between the free land of the American West and the stability
of established society in the East.

The doctrine, as it was formalized

by historians, further emphasized the impact on the wages, conditions
and contentment of eastern laborers.
free land:

It assumed a dual benefit from

the workers who emigrated found opportunity in the West

as farmers which eastern society denied them; and workers who did
not emigrate benefited from a "thinning out" of the labor ranks,
which kept wages high and facilitated workers’ bargaining position.
Although this formalized doctrine was largely the product of histor
ical scholarship, the assumed relationship between free land and
I

eastern industrial society was a canon of nineteenth century thought.
This thesis will explore the origin and nature of this perceived
relationship and its consequences in post-Civil War intellectual
life.

I
In the historiographical arena, the theory that America’s
abundant unoccupied land served as a "safety valve for discontent"
is associated with the work of Frederick Jackson Turner.

Turner

formulated the doctrine as part of his larger frontier thesis which
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initiated a reappreciation of the role played by the West in American
development.

Because it drew so heavily from the post-war intellec

tual milieu, Turner’s work stood as a pivotal point between contem
porary observation and historical study.

Contemporary commentaries

on the changes confronting the United States because of the imminent
exhaustion of its public domain were particularly salient to his
essays.^

For Turner's generation, viewing the open frontier in

retrospect, the perceived benefits of free land gained clarity and
acceptance.

Josiah Strong in his 1885 tract, Our Country, provided

an early expression of this mentality.

Strong tempered his optimis

tic prophecy of American destiny with the warning that when the
supply of free land disappeared, "we shall enter upon a new era and
shall more rapidly approximate the European conditions of life."^
Turner's writings also captured this appreciation of what free land
meant for America in terms of what its absence would mean.
With this context, it was not surprising that Turner's
frontier thesis and the safety valve doctrine struck a responsive
chord among contemporary American scholars.

In an 1896 essay, "The

Problem of the West," Turner stated as an historical hypothesis
what had been only years earlier reluctant speculation:

"Failures

in one area can no longer be made good by taking up land on a new
frontier; the conditions of a settled society are being reached with
suddenness and c o n f u s i o n . I n a 1903 article for Atlantic Monthly,
he best articulated his safety valve doctrinet

"Whenever social

conditions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital tended
to press upon labor or political restraints to impede the freedom of
the mass, there was this gate of escape to the free conditions of the

f r o n t i e r . T h e contrast between America's former social fluidity
and impending "settled” conditions carried a compelling explanatory
value for the America of 1900.

As an observer of America on the

brink of an important transition, Turner consolidated and elevated
a strain of thought that found more than a coincidence in the
disappearance of free land and socio-economic dislocation.
Turner's doctrines lived without concerted opposition only
as long as he himself lived.

After the venerated historian's death

in 1932, the safety valve thesis became a focus of intense historio
graphical debate.-*

The challenges of Turner's critics and the defenses

by his disciples have been largely responsible for shaping the modern
historian's concept of the safety valve.

Most significant were the

arguments of Fred Shannon and Murray Kane who, writing in the era of
the Great Depression, examined the historical role of the safety valve
in mitigating labor discontent and the impact of economic depression,
and found it noticeably ineffective.

Kane posited the now-accepted

evidence that more emigration to the West occurred in years of pros
perity than depression, thereby casting doubt on the safety v alve's
literal meaning.

Shannon took this criticism even further and declared

that "a safety-valve is of use only when pressure reaches the danger
point."6

Arch-Turnerian Joseph Schafer denied the validity of Shannon's

pressure-point qualification and raised a new standard for debate--the
relatively high wages of the American worker--as evidence of the
safety valve's effectiveness.^

Schafer also jousted with the conten

tion of Carter Goodrich and Sol Davidson that few urban laborers
emigrated, and emphasized instead the role of the safety valve in
drawing off the potential discontent of immigrants and farm laborers.^

In two important articles, Clarence Danhof supported the skepticism
of Goodrich and Davidson with strong evidence that few eastern
workers could afford western migration.^

Historians have arrived

at a consensus based especially on the arguments of Shannon,
Kane and Danhof, but have retained the belief that free land carried
a social-psychological significance as perceived opportunity.

Debate

has stalemated at this point, with only a few constructive modifica
tions offered since the 1 9 4 0 s . ^

The strong skepticism raised by

Shannon and Kane has not, however, overcome Joseph Schafer's lastditch defense that a safety valve at least prevented discontent from
growing much worse.
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Although Schafer's arguments generally leave little room for
conclusive debate, that historian did suggest one course for re
examining the safety valve doctrine.

Why, he asked, do Turner's

detractors insist on attributing the thesis to Turner?

Why not

call it George Henry Evans' or Thomas Hart Benton's or even Benjamin
Franklin's thesis?12

Indeed, the origins of the safety valve concept

are found throughout the intellectual climate of the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and they do shed a different light on the
safety valve.

Historians have by no means neglected contemporary

views of the safety valve, but, rather than analyzing them to
inductively arrive at a nineteenth century concept of the safety
valve, they have focused on contemporaries'

supposedly blind optimism.

Furthermore, historians commonly have juxtaposed the expectations of
ante-bellum Homestead advocates with the disappointing results of the
Homestead A c t .13 This oversimplified the perception of what an opera
tive safety valve was supposed to mean for America and, more importantly,

8
ignored the contemporary disillusionment with the Homestead Act.
Observers were painfully aware of the obstructions which prevented
free land from bestowing its benefits upon American society.

There

was in fact much consistency in attitude of the ante- and postbellum advocates of a safety valve.

Rather than being blinded and

prostrated by optimism, they were concerned with implementing the
changes essential to the proper functioning of a safety valve.

II
The passage of the Homestead Act was a watershed in the
intellectual history of the safety valve only in the sense that
the Act gave post-war land reformers a tangible reference point
for their efforts.

Otherwise, the existence of the law did not

significantly alter the safety valve ideal articulated during the
thirty year campaign for the Homestead Act.

It is therefore necessary

to examine the homestead movement before analyzing the safety valve
in its post-bellum intellectual milieu.
The most vociferous spokesman for the homestead movement,
the multi-faceted Horace Greeley, articulated a wide-ranging view
of the safety valve.

Greeley’s view was illustrative of the contem

porary context of the safety valve.

In "Land Reform," an essay

written in the 1840s, Greeley predicted that a Homestead Act would
promote immensely the independence, enlightenment, morality,
industry and comfort of our entire laboring population ever
more . . . .
and diminish the pressure of competition in
the Labor market throughout the country, and enable the
hireling to make terms with his employer as the duration of
his daily toil and the amount of his recompense.14
As a form of insurance for the mobility of labor, the safety valve
performed a larger function with significance for the stability of

the whole nation.

The public lands were, Greeley asserted,

regulator of Labor and Capital,
social e n g i n e . G r e e l e y

"the

the safety valve of our industrial

was, of course, both an advocate of

labor and a promoter of industry.

He was a curious blend of

industrial prophet and agrarian utopian, traditional conservative
and labor radical,

eastern urbanite and western booster.

He was

able to reconcile these apparent contradictions by equating the
economic rewards of free western land with a benevolent industrial
order.
Just as Greeley was able to reconcile contradictions in his
personal philosophy b y associating free land with universal benefits,
spokesmen o f diverse social interests also concurred on the desir
ability of a liberal land policy.

Jeffersonian disciples, exponents

of the natural primacy of labor, as well as believers in the
existing American social order, cited the vast public domain as
the key to the existence or establishment of ideal society.

The

proponents of these various perspectives shared a belief that the
advantage represented by A m e r i c a ’s immense domain would guarantee
social fluidity, harmony and economic prosperity--benefits that were
often contrasted with the economic and social maladies of the "Old
World."

The rigid class lines of European society, most vividly

illustrated by the system of land tenure, were antithetical to
America's revered mobility.

The public domain offered both oppor

tunity and a margin for error to avoid Europe's misfortunes,

to

forestall indefinitely the conditions of "settled society," and,
therefore,

to insure the safety of America's free institutions.

America's youth, openness,and opportunity-epitomized by the
vast public domain--were reinforced by a faith in natural laws which

would maintain these unique features.

Not coincidentally,

the

theoretical basis of the safety valve involved two strands of
liberal thought which emphasized the importance of freely operating
laws and abundant natural opportunities.
was classical economics.

The first line of thought

In abstract terms, classical wage and

population theory was virtually synonymous with the safety valve.
Political economists agreed that,

if the growth rate of the laboring

population greatly exceeded capital accumulation, workers had little
choice but to starve or e m i g r a t e . ^

Another canon was that the free

d o m of workers to emigrate or change occupation was essential to a
stable s y s t e m . ^

A m e r i c a ’s free land, besides being a constant source

of wealth and capital accumulation, and thus alleviating much of the
population pressure, was an obvious outlet for surplus population.
The theoretical emphasis on land as one chief source of wealth
reinforced this role.

18

The connection between classical thought and the safety valve
was at times more than theoretical.
John Stuart Mill, was,

The last great liberal economist,

for example, an active proponent of emigration

as a remedy for Britain's unemployment p r o b l e m . ^

New England poli

tical economist Francis Bowen applied economic theory to the United
States and argued that its free institutions defied many of the
restrictions developed by European theorists.

Bowen's "American

Political Economy" discounted the negative alternatives implied by
natural laws:

American workers would migrate or seek other employ

ment, not starve.

Bowen also referred explicitly to a safety valve

of free land which, along with extreme occupational mobility, maintained high wages, economic opportunity and fluid class lines.

90

The classical economic foundation was not ordinarily so overt in

the contemporary understanding of the safety valve, but was an
assumption to be weighed against reality.

By prescribing for economic

stability the features that America supposedly had, classical
theory vindicated faith in the conviction that free land distinguished
America from the Old World.

Conversely, the public domain rendered

trust in natural laws easier.
A second strand of thought, the natural rights tradition,
was the basis for the more idealistic perspectives on the safety valve
In many ways, natural rights theory resembled classical economic theory
but, because it rested on a more comprehensive critique of the social
order, it was not as universally acceptable.

Natural rights theory

described more than a relationship between free land and ideal society
but its most important manifestations involved the distribution of
"natural opportunities."

As it pertained to the safety valve, natural

rights theory can best be explained by the following syllogism:

God

endowed all men with an inalienable birthright to the soil; the soil
was the source of all wealth and opportunity; only a man's labor
could create wealth from the soil; thus, only the man who worked the
soil could legitimately own the land, and a man could own only what
he could cultivate.

A logical corollary to this was the belief that

monopolization of the land violated natural rights, denied men
natural opportunites, and led to rampant inequality.

One of the

earliest statements of this philosophy was by Thomas Skidmore in 1829.
Skidmore, in his radical anti-rent appeal to New Yorkers, The Rights
of Man to Property!, deprecated land monopolists for subsisting on
the labor of others.

He, like many of his ideological descendents,

traced his principles to the writings of Thomas Jefferson.

Proponents of natural rights theory and of classical economics
shared a confidence that, as long as circumstances allowed the proper
functioning of natural laws, ideal conditions would prevail.

Although

the criteria for conducive circumstances varied, the desired conditions
were analogous.

Economic prosperity, social harmony, and the contin

ued functioning of free institutions were contingent upon obedience
to natural laws*

The safety valve occupied a paradoxical position

in each of these traditions of thought.

On one hand, it was a

natural law which regulated social and economic conditions.

On the

other hand, especially in natural rights theory, the safety valve
was one element of the ideal order, a by-product of the natural laws.
In short, the safety valve was often seen as more than a process or a
means to an end; its operation was virtually synonymous with an ideal
society.
Because of its connotations, contemporaries equated the safety
valve with reform, or with the recovery of assumed pre-requisites
for a free and stable economic system.

Thus, by virtue of its most

important intellectual sources, the safety valve was less a descrip
tion of than a prescription for American society.

Observers from

a classical economic perspective were less demanding of the system
than were natural rights advocates, but, throughout the century, ob
servers from both vantage points perceived the existence of abnormal
circumstances which prevented the safety valve from functioning pro
perly.

Consequently, contemporary references to the safety valve

usually accompanied appeals for the recovery of a freely operating
and, therefore, harmonious system.
The campaign for a public land system favoring the small
settler, which culminated in the passage of the Homestead Act, reflected

13
these intellectual origins.

The relevance of economic and natural

rights theory was not, of course, limited to the public domain,
but, as the apotheosis of opportunity, the domain figured prominently
in both.

Eastern conservatives had, by 1820, begun to subordinate

their contempt for the West as a rival for people and power to an
appreciation for the value of the West in dissolving social disoo
content. *

Fledgling labor groups in the Jacksonian era also

considered the West in their new calculus of social justice and
reform.

Arising from the interest of labor in the public lands

was the voice of the English-born editor George Henry Evans.

In

him, the natural rights tradition found its most articulate spokes
man and the safety valve its first great exponent.
Evans was, perhaps, the most important figure in the develop
ment of the safety valve concept.

The impressionable Horace Greeley,

although the famous advocate of "Go West, young man," borrowed his
agrarianism from Evans.

Evans pioneered the movement which later

spawned the Homestead Act and shaped the safety valve into a funda
mentally anti-industrial, anti-urban ideal.

Similar to William H.

Sylvis, Terence V. Powderly, and other post-war figures, Evans was
both an advocate of land reform and a labor spokesman.

In the 1830s

and 1840s he edited a series of labor journals, most prominently the
New York Workingman's Advocate, and sold his land reform program to
the idealistic New England Workingman's Association and the Industrial
Congresses.

In 1844 he forged the influential political pressure

organ, the National Reform Association (NRA), to thrust the homestead
movement onto the national stage.
The National Reform Platform consisted of the equal, individual
and inalienable homestead, a system of land tenure which would prevent
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monopoly and guarantee m a n 1s natural rights.

Although Evans' per

sonal philosophy included a blueprint for a complete "township
d e m o c r a c y , "23

and was applicable to all landholding, National Reform

concentrated on liberalizing public land policy.

One famous mani

festation of agrarian-based public land reform, the

1847

"Vote

Yourself a Farm" circular, was both a political polemic and an
embodiment of the natural right tradition:
Are you an American citizen? Then you are the joint
owner of. the public lands. Why not take advantage of your
property to provide yourself a home? Why not vote yourself
a farm?
Are you tired of slavery--of drudging for others--of
poverty and its attendant miseries? Then, vote yourself
a farm.
Are you a believer in the scripture? Then assert
that the land is the Lord's, because he made it. Resist
then the blasphemers who extract money from His work, even
as you would resist them should they claim to be worshipped
for His holiness.
Emancipate the poor from the necessity of
encouraging such blasphemy— vote the freedom of the public
lands . . . .
with reform Capital with its power for good
undiminished, would lose the power to oppress; and a new
era would dawn upon the earth and rejoice the soul of a
thousand generations.
Therefore, forget not to vote your
self a f a r m . 2 4
For Evans, land played a crucial role in determining the
relationship between capital and labor.

Equal division of the soil

would garner for the laborer the right to what he produced.23

Under

lying this belief were the principles that labor created all wealth
and that land provided all natural opportunity.

The ultimate result

of land reform would be a society of independent producers, freed
from the chains of the wage system.
restoration of opportunity.
explained in an

1845

The crux of land reform was the

One man may work for another, Evans

debate, "but not by compulsion, as now."^°

lay his safety valve vision.

Herein

Not only would men be able to take

advantage of their birthright to the soil, but they would also benefit
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by the restoration of the proper relation of capital to labor.

The

safety valve would operate on the tangible level of emigration as
an outlet and an opportunity for laborers, and the abstract level
of adjusting society to nature.
The appeal of such a theory to ante-bellum labor reflected
the popularity of reform in general.

Workers did not accept Evans'

doctrine as pure agrarianism, but as one of several doctrines assert
ing the rights of labor.

Evans himself embraced educational reform

and a shorter work day as concomitant causes,
of ante-bellum labor reform,

in the larger picture

land reform shared the platform of Anti-

Renters, Loco Focos, and W o r k i n g m e n 's Parties with demands
abolition of deb t o r 1s prison,

for

the ten-hour day, equal access to

education, and a host of other issues.

This broad, often indiscriminate

adoption of reform or anti-monopoly campaigns was also a characteristic
of post-war labor reform and underscored the close association of
the safety valve with an ideal social order.

Regardless of how

casually land reform may have been accepted,

labor organizations

actively rallied behind Evans for National Reform.

In this era,

land

reform was not an anomolous issue for organized labor to support.
Historian H e l e n e Z a h l e r , in her preeminent work on the subject, con
cluded that "hard-core" trade unions may have been lukewarm to land
reform, but played an important role in its development by not opposing

it.27
As land reform became a national political issue, it was not
without detractors.

It could not escape the "agrarian" (synonymous

then with "communist") label and often conjured up memories of Thomas
Skidmore's leveling fanaticism of the 1820s.
became respectable.

Pure agrarianism never

As late as 1859, when the Homestead Act was only
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three years from passage (and opposition was sectional, not
ideological), Congressman George W. Julian felt compelled to qualify
the "agrarianism" of the Homestead bill.

Julian invoked the popular

lesson of Rome's decay through monopolization of its land, and
juxtaposed it with America's Jeffersonian tradition of small farms.
He appealed for a distinction between agrarian hostility to property
and the Homestead bill's true objective of reforming an unjust and
potentially fatal land s y s t e m . ^
Land reform gained political respectability, but lost much
of its ideological purity in the homestead movement.

Historians

traditionally view the Homestead Act as Congress's formal surrender
of the "proprietor principle" of public land administration.

Hence*

forth, Congress disposed of land liberally to private citizens.29
The government, it will be shown, surrendered the domain as a source
of revenue, but hardly showed favoritism to the settler.

Also,

the long years of debate in Congress over various Homestead bills
obscured the original nonpartisanship of the NRA.

Political animosity

between East and West resulted in debate that embodied the theoretical
sources of the safety valve, but clearly subordinated ideology to
sectionalism.

Western statesmen accused eastern interests of opposing

free land because it would draw the cheap surplus labor required for
eastern factories.

In one of the most cited speeches opposing the

Homestead bill, Representative Josiah Sutherland, of New York, in 1852
warned that, contrary to its title, the act would not encourage but
would harm industry and laborers by dispersing the nation's resources
and attacking the sanctity of p r o p e r t y . R e f e r e n c e s

to the safety

valve in Congressional debate usually assumed a negative tack; few
men dared oppose free land in principle, but advocates attributed to
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their opponents a hostility to freedom.

Despite such rhetorical

tricks, the most divisive issue was not natural rights ideology, but
whether East or West would reap the lion's share of the wealth from
the public lands.
In the late 1840s, much to the disgust of the National Re
formers, slavery was injected into the homestead debates.32

The

loose rivalry between East and West shifted to the increasingly
solidified hostility of North and South.

With the rise of Republi

canism, the Homestead became a sectional and a party issue.

These

developments further diluted the original ideological content of the
homestead movement.

As Eric Foner has written, preserving the public

domain for the white settler was a veritable panacea for the infant
OO

Republican party's "free soil, free labor, free men" ideology.

Per

ceiving that the Homestead Act had become a weapon in the Republican
arsenal, the South solidified in its opposition.

When the ftwnestead

Act became law in May 1862, the southern obstructionists were con
veniently in rebellion.

Ill
The existence of the Homestead Act placed post-war land
reformers in an ambivalent position.

The act was universally praised

as the ultimate in liberal legislation (see ChapterII) and the in
auguration of an ideal land system.

What more, afterall, could be

demanded of a system that gave to every male head of household up
to 160 acres of land?

The Homestead Act, however, especially in

light of other land policy developments, seriously deviated from
the principles of National Reform.

For example, the Act did not

make the homestead inalienable or non-transferrable, and thus left
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the door open to fraud and eventual monopoly.

More importantly,

the liberality represented by the Homestead Act was only part of
a larger Congressional munificence which granted several hundred
million acres of the domain to subsidize railroad construction and
the establishment of educational institutions, and to reward
military service.

The common feature of this generosity was the

desire to use the domain to develop national wealth.

The common

result was a land system that fostered precisely the kind of mono
poly that the National Reformers sought to destroy.

Rather than a

society of settlers and independent producers, the actual Home
stead Act envisioned an ideal of universal wealth.

The settler was

less the consummation of an idealistic civilization than an agent
of a materialistic one.
Reformers were not oblivious to the flaws in the land
system.

Before his 1859 death, Evans recognized that the homestead

movement had become more of a sectional than an ideological issue
because of slavery.

Had he lived longer, he undoubtedly would have

joined the chorus that protested the dilution of the homestead ideal.
Throughout the post-war era, land and labor reformers attacked the
evils of the land system and sought to reconcile it with the home
stead ideal.

In effect, land reform after 1862 was simply an exten

sion of the ante-bellum movement.

A pure vision of the Homestead

Act provided the touchstone for a generation of reformers who
sought to finish the work of theit ancestors.

Whether these re

formers believed that the Homestead Act served at least as a
partial safety valve was never clear.

Their activities indicated

only that they did not believe that the land system fulfilled its
task in guaranteeing Americafs future.
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In many ways land reform became a more urgent issue after
1862.

The evils that were thought to be inherent in an unfree

situation loomed over post-war America and testified to the ineffec
tiveness of the safety valve.
epidemic proportions.
republic:

Monopoly, for example, reached

Fear of monopoly had originated with the

monopoly was considered incompatible with free institu

tions; grossly unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity was
a symptom of the Old World encroaching upon the new.

Similar to

the ferment of the Jacksonian era, the later anti-monopoly campaign
embraced much more than land reform.

Post-war America confronted

reformers with the rapid concentration of population and wealth,
the "monopolization" of the means of transportation, currency, and
land, and a salient increase in inequality.

Significantly, the

munificent mid-century federal land policy had encouraged land and
transportation monopolies.

Land monopoly was thus intimately

associated with the evils that threatened American institutions.

In

the post-war milieu, this relationship between land monopoly and
its siblings was not always clearly defined.

There was a two-way

causal flow between monopolized land and the impact of other industrial
ills.

On one hand, the monopoly of land nullified the beneficent

effects of free land for modern American society; on the other, it
was the "conspiracy" of modern monopolies that choked off the
safety valve.

This duality characterized most comments on monopoly

and the safety valve.
The post-war threat of associated monopolies occasioned a
revival of natural-rights based reformism.

This revival accounted

for the most idealistic pronouncements on the relation between free
land and the American laborer.

Obviously,

from the natural rights
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perspective,

the appropriation of man's common birthright by a few

persons and corporations was tantamount to the enslavement of the
masses.

Land monopoly impeded the freedom and independence on

which individuals and a stable society depended.

The upsetting

of the balance of society would enslave even those workers who did
not intend to emigrate to the land.

In this sense,

free land was

valuable to the worker as much more than an outlet for emigration.
It was critical for his status and condition.
F rom this reformist perspective,
than a safety valve,

strictly defined.

tive device, but a regulator.

the safety valve was more
It was not a pressure sensi

Rather than providing an escape

from an oppressive industrialized society,
establishment of that very society.

it was to prevent the

It was originally an anti-

urban, anti-industrial ideal, and remained a vision of society
free from the evil attributes of modernism that plagued British
society.

Rural values and self-employment would prevail over urban

complexities and the wage system.

The equitable treatment of labor

vis-a-vis capital would eliminate the seeds of social discontent
and inequality.

Most importantly,

free opportunity and fluidity

would assure the continued health of America's free institutions and
mobility for the indiv i d u a l .

Adherents to this safety valve vision

were not agrarians with plans for communistic utopias, but the selfappointed guardians of American ideals.
The perceived ineffectiveness of the safety valve carried
implications for post-war society beyond its association with
monopoly.

Many contemporaries considered the safety valve's para

mount benefit to be the insurance of social mobility and the conse
quent prevention of such urban problems .as over-population, pauperism

and discontent.

The overcrowding of eastern seaboard cities, exa

cerbated by swelling immigration, clearly defied the natural laws
governing population distribution.

Urban crowding constituted

a severe danger to all the groups studied in this thesis.

Urban

ism was antithetical to the Jeffersonianism of the land reformers;
it impoverished workers and contributed to the further subordina
tion of labor; and it disturbed eastern conservatives who associated
overcrowded cities with economic chaos and social disorder.

Similarly,

the encroachment of the Old World, best exemplified by alien landholding in the West, provoked universal protest and focused attention
on the impotent safety valve.

Although each of the above groups

attributed the impotence of the safety valve to different causes and
weighed its effects in different terms, they concurred on fundamental
points:

the malfunctioning of the safety valve defied assumptions

underlying the security of free institutions, natural laws and, hence,
American uniqueness.

The assumption of an operative safety valve

was thus part of a prescriptive vision of American society.
The idealism of this safety valve vision has been diluted
in the development of the modern doctrine.

Historians ignore the

intimate connection between the vision and reform, as well as the
comprehensive contemporary analysis of the safety valve's actual
ineffectiveness.

Frederick Jackson Turner, as a contemporary of the

idealism, almost defined the vision.

By describing the safety valve

as a mechanism for avoiding a society that had become too "crystal
lized" he captured the nomenclature.

But, by focusing on the in

dividual escaping the advancing society, he, too, failed to note
the role the safety valve was to play in preventing the crystalliza
tion.

In the contemporary understanding, the fate of the individual

was a barometer for American civilization.

Later historians have

accurately described some of the ends the safety valve was to pro
duce, but not the means.

The safety valve was to improve the

condition, economic standing and bargaining position of labor, as
well as to alleviate social discontent, but not simply as an outlet
for population.

The term "safety valve" has in fact circumscribed

the modern understanding of what free land meant in nineteenth
century life.
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CHAPTER II
THE SAFETY VALVE IN PUBLIC LAND POLICY

The primary requisite for the practical operation of the
safety valve was a public land system that served to facilitate it.
On the surface, post-Civil War land policy appeared to be the per
fect vehicle for the safety valve.

The undisputed centerpiece of

the system was the Homestead Act, with its connotations for unbounded
individual opportunity and governmental liberality.

It was a canon

of congressional and national thought that the actual settler was
and should be the chief beneficiary of public land policy.

The

Homestead Act, however, was not entirely commensurate with the
ideals that spawned it.

Furthermore, the land system as a whole

diluted the value of the Homestead Act by offering opportunities
to speculators as well as to settlers, and thereby hastening the
exhaustion of the public domain.

In this sense, public land policy

contributed to the perceived ineffectiveness of the safety valve.
The rhetorical reverence of Congress for the actual settler
was deceiving, but not necessarily duplicitous.

Most congressmen

did not praise the Homestead Act while consciously subverting it in
favor of special interests.

Instead, Congress persisted in trying

to legislate for both the small settler and the corporate developer.
This "incongruous land system," as historian Paul W. Gates has dubbed
it, controverted the principle behind the Homestead Act.1

Legislation

allegedly intended to benefit the small settler often worked in favor
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of the speculator.

For example, the Timber Culture Act of 1873 and

the Desert Land Act of 1877 tried to encourage small holdings in the
inhospitable semi-arid West, but negligent monitoring made them a
boon for speculators.

The most egregious element in the incongru

ous land system was the direct granting of land to railroad corpora
tions.

This created a glaring contradiction between small parcels

of free Homestead land and the unlimited sale of corporate land,
which often led to the accumulation of vast private holdings.

The

land system thus alienated the settler from hundreds of millions of
acres of the public domain, and, in the public mind, threw the virtu
ous settler to the corporate lions.
Not only did corporations and speculators monopolize millions
of acres, thus artificially closing land to settlement, but also
post-war Civil War America faced the possibility of the natural
exhaustion of its arable domain.

The unprecedented passing of land

into private hands after 1870 followed closely optimistic forecasts
that the domain would last between 200 and 900 years.2

The munificence

with which Congress had disposed of land at mid-century was postulated
on an "inexhaustible" domain.

The disappearance of unappropriated

arable land underscored the contradictions in the philosophy behind
land administration.

On the one hand, Congress had accepted the

premise that the wisest use for the land was to bestow it liberally
to private interests.

On the other hand, the implicit assumption

that free land was a precondition of American uniqueness depended
upon conservation of the finite supply.

The visibly shrunken domain

increased the concern for the future of the embattled settler and
exacerbated fears of a closed frontier.

But, since so much of the
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domain was held illegally or by corporate "middlemen,11 there were
many who believed that land was still theoretically available for
settlers.

Until the closing decades of the century, reclamation of

land from unauthorized holders and from the restrictions of a
semi-arid climate allowed Congress to avoid the implications of an
exhausted domain.
The most striking feature of land policy formulation in the
late nineteenth century was the popularity of criticism and reform
rhetoric.

Party platforms, presidents and cabinet officers univer

sally deprecated the chasm between the Homestead Act and land grants,
and the resultant accumulation of private empires in the West.3

In

particular, the administrations of Presidents Garfield, Arthur and
Cleveland were known as an age of reform in the history of land policy
because of the full-scale attacks mounted on fencing, unauthorized
landholding and alien landlordism.

The ubiquitousness of reform

rhetoric contrasted sharply with the failure of Congress to imple
ment reform in an enduring or significant manner.

Railroads and

other special interests exercised considerable influence over a
conservative Senate in the 1870s and 1880s, and, more importantly,
few politicians fully accepted the exigencies of reform.

Recognizing

the subversion of the Homestead Act was simple; comprehensively re
shaping land policy around that law was not.
The best barometer for the land reform movement and,

therefore,

for the consistency of land policy with the safety valve vision, was
the rhetoric and activity of a handful of Congressional idealists.

In particular, Representatives George W. Julian and William S. Holman,
of Indiana, and Lewis Payson, of Illinois, articulated a natural rights
philosophy predicated on the centrality of small holdings to the
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stability of American society.^

They adhered to the Jeffersonian

dichotomy between the independence of the yeoman farmer and the mis
erable dependence of the homeless worker.-*

Their philosophy was

a substantive link to the ante-bellum National Reformers and a chief
source of opinion on the relation between free land and American
institutions•
George W. Julian was an especially vociferous speaker and
prolific writer on the land question from the 1850s to the 1890s.
In noted speeches in 1851 and 1868, he emphasized the relevance of
homes to all reforms and to the fostering of industry, thrift,
national loyalty, self-control, temperance and education.

The

Hoosier Representative exemplified the Jeffersonian ideal and its
role in the safety valve concept when he stated in 1851 that:

"It

may be taken for granted, as a general truth, that a nation will be
powerful, prosperous and happy in proportion to the number of
independent cultivators of its soil."^

Ideally, free land served

to alleviate urban suffering, insured free institutions, gave men
access to natural opportunity and guaranteed prosperity.

It was

imperative that land be given to actual settlers only in small
parcels, and,therefore, perform these functions indefinitely.

Apply

ing these principles in the post-Civil War era, Julian and other
reformers equated the obvious subversion of the homestead ideal
with the myriad of threats to American civilization.

The laws govern

ing the relation between the land and the people necessarily shaped
institutions, he commented in 1873.

The current "false" relations

constituted the "most formidable" trial of American democracy and
was inevitably associated with corruption, encroaching "feudalism"
of the social order and the domination of cities.^

30
Julian was not alone in this crisis mentality assessment of
the land question.

In fact, reform rhetoric, warning of the

Europeanization of American society and drawing parallels between
land monopoly and other social evils, became as popular in the postCivil War intellectual climate as the avowed reverence for the
small settler.

Congress itself invoked both the small holdings

bias and reform rhetoric throughout the era, and occasionally seemed
intent on legislating this idealism.

Actual reform, however, occurred

only when it did not blunt western development, or when the chasm
between the homestead ideal and land policy became too great.

Despite

its interest in reform, Congress expended more energy trying to
reconcile the homestead ideal with the vision of a rich, developed
West.

The role of the safety valve vision in the formulation of

public land policy is, therefore, best understood by analyzing the
influence of land reform idealism.

I
Post-war reform attempted to re-shape policy so as to
implement the homestead ideal.

In practical terms, this translated

into efforts to reserve the public lands for the actual settler
in small parcels.

This strategy had many manifestations.

Congress

never seriously considered withdrawing land to all except homestead
entry, so the real thrust of reform was to define, preserve and
extend the rights of settlers vis-a-vis their corporate rivals.
Since reformers considered the public lands America's future trust,
they had to assure the settler access to as much of the domain as
possible.

Insuring the rights of the settler, it was assumed, would

also insure an operative safety valve; men would seek their natural

31
opportunities once they were accessible.

Reformers thus attempted

to extend the land available to the homestead settler and delay
the day on which the nation's sacred future trust would be only a
memory.
The first great land reform issue after the Civil War was
the protest against railroad land grants.

Railroads had been

the primary recipients of Congressional munificence since 1850
and continued to be the symbol of development and civilization in
the West.

Much of the initial enthusiasm for railroads had been

founded on the belief that they were public servants.

Land grant

railroads, endowed with the most sacred trust, were especially
subject to high expectations.

The revelation that some railroad

corporations profited simply by the sale of their grants and the
construction of the road, and, conversely, that others held their
lands speculatively from sale and taxation, betrayed the public
trust.

As a consequence, the perception of railroads changed from

ally to enemy of settler and civilization.

Few men of 1865 denied

the value of railroads or of subsidizing their construction, but
many urged a halt to further generosity.
In the face of such criticism, Congress strove in its land
grants both to respect the rights of settlers and to assure the
rapid construction of railroads.

As early as 1864, in the first

Pacific Railroad bill, Congress altered the traditional provisions
that prevented the homesteading of land within grants.^

Nevertheless,

the "Homestead clause" featured in later grants did not eliminate
the unlimited sale of the public lands by private proprietors.

Un

satisfied with small concessions, reformers agitated for the cessation,

32
and then the forfeiture of land grants.

Pushed by Julian and

Holman, Congress hesitatingly acknowledged the incompatibility of
grants and

the Homestead Act.

In 1868, Julian sponsored a moderate

resolution

declaring the primacy of the Homestead and pre-emption

acts and stating that further grants "should be carefully scrutinized
and rigidly subordinated to the paramount purpose of securing homes
for the landless poor, the actual settler and tillage of the public
domain, and the consequent increase of the national

when

w e a l t h . " ^

Holman, in

the following year, proposed a resolution that did not

compromise

the homestead principle with grants, but called for

their cessation, Julian substituted a more conciliatory version.
Holman promptly withdrew his r e s o l u t i o n . I n March, 1870, Holman
submitted a similar resolution, which the House passed, declaring
itself in favor of discontinuing public land subsidies to railroads
and other c o r p o r a t i o n s C o n g r e s s

honored its resolution only

after passing a handful of grants, most notably one of eighteen million
acres for the Texas Pacific Railroad in 1871.
Public sympathy reinforced this Congressional reform impulse.

In 1868-69 Congress endured unprecedented public protest when it
supported a railroad corporation's efforts to displace thousands of
pre-emption settlers on the Cherokee Neutral Tract in Kansas.

The

tract had never been opened to settlement, but instead went directly
into the hands of a succession of railroad companies.

Widespread

charges of corruption accompanied the organization of para-military
protective societies among the unauthorized settlers.

No other

incident generated such criticism of Congress on the land grant issue.
Opposition to railroad grants spread as they became closely
associated with corruption, land monopoly and the oppression of
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settlers.

In the Senate, Democrat Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, armed

with a resolution of his state legislature, berated the evils of
land monopoly and asked whether:
this great and bountiful gift that Providence has bestowed
upon this nation . . . the public domain
shall be improved
for the benefit of the people, of the homeless, the desti
tute, the suffering, or whether it shall become the great
find of the speculators, or perpetual c o r p o r a t i o n s . ^
The occasion for Thurman's speech--the proposed grant to Oregon's
McMinnville Railroad--also incited a revealing House debate between
Indiana Democrat William Holman and Nevada Republican Thomas Fitch.
Fitch and a Republican ally, Aaron Sargent, of California, appealed
for the continued Western interest in the promotion of railroads,
and pointed out the curious opposition of Holman and other midwestern
er s to the kind of grants that had so greatly benefited their region.
As uncompromising as his idealist opponent, Fitch asked Congress
not to strip "the good ship progress," and stated bluntly that "jdj t
is better to have a railroad monopoly than to have no railroad at all.1^
Holman's address was a comprehensive lesson on the evils of
land monopoly and the necessity of preserving the safety valve of
the West for individual homes.

Throughout his opposition to the

McMinnville grant, he channeled petitions from city dwellers demand
ing exclusive use of land for actual settlers "on the grounds that
tens of thousands of the industrial classes of large cities and towns,
now unemployed, must seek an outlet and escape from the poverty and
distress which surround them or rapidly be driven to pauperism and
crime

Holman, freeing himself from the compromise between the

homestead and development ideals which prostrated reform, denied that
the value of railroads had any bearing on the issue.

16
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Congress did not pass the McMinnville grant and, after 1871,
concentrated its efforts on reclaiming the lands of railroad companies
which failed to construct within a reasonable period.

The long and

complex forfeiture movement received the blessing of House and
Senate committees, but ran afoul of the judiciary.

Despite the

ideological basis on which Holman and others placed the issue, it
was the prospect of a corporation completing its road, not a whole
sale recovery of land for the settler which guided Congressional
action.

When a general forfeiture act finally passed in 1890, it

was a limited measure, reclaiming only the land of the most
blatant violators."^
Congressional reformers attempted to extend the rights of
the homestead settler in other ways.

These efforts concentrated

on liberalizing the provisions of the Homestead Act, and met with
some success.^®

The net effect of these modifications was to

qualify more families for homesteads, to allow longer absences
from the land without losing title to it, and to make it easier to
turn pre-empted claims into legitimate homesteads.

More substantive

enlargement of settlers* rights did not seem altogether desirable.
The fact that some unscrupulous settlers used the Homestead Act for
small-scale speculation confronted Congress with a serious dilemma.
Liberalizing the act's provisions could make fraudulent claims
easier to obtain.

It was, however, difficult to challenge the

integrity of a few settlers, without appearing to be an enemy to all.
For example, the sincere efforts of Grover Cleveland’s first Land
Commissioner, W. A. J. Sparks, to ferret out false claims by suspending
all land patents in 1885 backfired and led ultimately to his dismissal.
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This latent suspicion of settlers did not preclude more
ambitious and invariably less successful efforts to proliferate
settlers on the domain.

The social discontent of the 1880s and

the threat of a closed frontier gave this objective special ur
gency.

Commenting on the exclusion of settlers from fertile lands

by monopoly, a House report in 1886 warned that "[t] ime and events
have given new emphasis to the importance of furnishing the land
less an opportunity to obtain homes . . . ."19
port in 1888 echoed this warning:

Another House re

"Already we have densely populated

cities, and a large class of what may not improperly be called poor
people.

It is a great and interesting question how we may best

distribute our remaining public lands among our landless citizens.
This strategy to recover the benefits of the safety valve by assuring
the existence of homestead land could be seen in the "free homestead"
movement in 1896-97.

Reformers struggled in vain to allow settlers

on former Indian land in Oklahoma to receive titles to their claims.
They appealed for the "brave, honest settler," who lacked the money
to pay for the land which the Government sold to raise revenue for
the displaced Indians.21
These stillborn campaigns to bring policy in line with the
homestead ideal illustrated the gap between an awareness of free
land as a potential safety valve and its actual ineffectiveness, and
the impotence of Congress in restoring it.

II
The revision of the Homestead Act, as well as the efforts
to reclaim land from railroads, rested on the belief that expanding
the land available to the homestead settler would guarantee the
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security of American institutions*

This expansion could be accom

plished either by the extension of the homesteader's rights vis-a-vis
the corporate landholders and speculators, or the expansion of the
lands on which the settler could make a home.

As Americans began

to realize the natural limitations of the cultivable domain, this
latter alternative acquired new significance.
The expansion of agriculture into the semi-arid and arid
West presented reformers with both an opportunity and a problem.
On one hand, the West was a potential haven for millions of addi
tional settlers; on the other hand, its natural features excluded
the settler from an indeterminable portion of the remaining land.
It had been one of the chief assignments of land grant railroads
to prepare and promote settlement of the new West--a task they per
formed admirably.

Largely because of the railroads and a rainy

cycle supporting their "rain follows the plow" dogma, the early
nineteenth century image of the Great Plains as "the Great American
Desert" seemed extinct by the 1 8 7 0 s . ^
Nevertheless, a few dissenters, particularly General W. B.
Hazen, maintained that self-deluding railroad promoters were begging
disaster by planting isolated communities on land incapable of
supporting them.
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Following Hazen's skepticism was the scientifi

cally-based revisionism of John Wesley Powell, the naturalist-turned
army officer who served in the government's employ as chief of the
Rocky Mountain Survey.
Powell's analysis and programs had a delayed, but immeasur
able, impact on public land policy.

Under his guidance, the federal

Government for the first time acquired accurate knowledge of its
territory and was able to classify its resources and potential uses.

This knowledge, however, did not produce a consensus on how the
remaining domain should best be managed.

The task fell to Powell

to challenge the prudence of transplanting midwestern model agricul
tural communities into the semi-arid West.

Historian Henry Nash

Smith has written that Powell's revisions posed an intolerable
challenge to the prevailing myth that small farms could thrive
throughout the West.

For Smith, the opposition to Powell by

reformers like Julian was a tragic result of this myth-induced
"imaginative v e i l . " ^

Indeed, Powell, by questioning the efficacy

of the 160 acre homestead and the wisdom of free, unmanaged settle
ment, trespassed against the Jeffersonian and the free-migration
traditions.

Nevertheless, Powell and the land reformers were in

philosophical agreement on the desirability of reserving the arable
lands for homes.

This common interest was especially obvious when

contrasted with the exponents of western development, whose opposi
tion to Powell was ultimately the most significant.
Powell's influence was most heavily felt in his 1878 Report
on the Arid Lands of the United States and the 1879 Report of the
Public Lands Commission, of which he was a member.

Both reports

called for a classification of the remaining domain and suggested
legislation for the disposal of each distinct category.

This

classification would, in itself, influence later formulation of
policy; it allowed the streamlining of the laws and practical separa
tion of land for the settler from land for the developer.

Powell

believed that there could be no uniform standard for land policy
in the heterogeneous climate and topography of the West.

The core

of his revisionism was the plan for colonies in "irrigable districts
based on small landholding, but using co-operative water management.

38
His most heretical proposal was the establishment of 2,560 acre
pasturage districts, also to be individually owned, but organized
in co-operative resource

c o m m u n i t i e s

.25

Despite his trespass

against the sacred 160 acre homestead, Powell believed in small
homesteads and his sympathies were squarely in the reformist tradi
tion.

With his insight that distribution of water would govern the

future of the West, Powell anxiously considered the formulation of
"capital intensive” irrigation companies:
Every man who turns his attention to this department of
industry is considered a public benefactor.
But if in
the eagerness for present development a land and water
system shall grow up in which the practical control of
all agriculture shall fall into the hands of water com
panies, evils will result therefrom that generations may
not be able to correct, and the very men who are now lauded
as benefactors to the country will, in the ungovernable
reaction which is sure to come, be denounced as oppressors
of the people.26
Water monopoly, in other words, would subvert the homestead ideal as
surely as land monopoly.

If the semi-arid West was to accommodate

homestead settlers, Powell believed, a new policy was required to
insure their survival.
The Public Lands Commission, appointed to revise the tangle
of land laws and to propose reforms, reflected and amended Powell's
work.

Among its other members was Thomas Donaldson, who, like

Powell and the Commission, espoused a colonization Homestead Act to
facilitate settlement of the Plains.27

The Commission combined a

curious recognition of western interests with traditional reform
idealism and Powell's revisionism.

It called initially for the

reservation of all arable lands for settlers under the Homestead
Act.
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The arid lands, however, required different treatment.

"Poor men cannot make homes on the irrigable lands till capital

intervenes for their reclamation," the Commission admitted.

It

went on to recommend the sale of unlimited quantities of irrigable
land to anyone (including corporations) subject to a timetable of
improvement and reclamation.
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Unlike Powell, who preferred co

operative reclamation or government assistance to corporate land
development, the Commission compromised between the homestead and
development ideals.

Both reports were significant for their denial

of the efficacy of free settlement.

Reformers, despite their con

cern over land monopoly and the exhaustion of the public lands,
retained their faith that a just land system would enable emigration
from the city to the country, and the establishment of homes in the
West.

They considered such revisions as enlarged .holdings and

co-operative settlement superfluous to reform*

Although Congress

pigeonholed both reports, their suggestions resurfaced in the sub
sequent decades.
The most tangible and immediate legacy of the reports was
the recognition that the geographically heterogeneous Far West
required a different policy than the Midwest.

This revision in

strategy did not, however, occasion a revision in ideology.

For

example, in 1888, William Holman, as a member of the House Committee
on Public Lands, substituted a comprehensive bill for a plethora
of land bills submitted to the 50th Congress.

The substitute, mod

eled after the 1879 Commission's comprehensive bill, classified
the remaining domain and specified the mode of disposal for each
type.

Not surprisingly, all agricultural land would be disposed

according to "the most valuable purpose . . .

to increase the

number of homesteads and enlarge the lot of freeholders."

Holman dis

sented from the proposal for 2,560 acre pasturage districts.30

Holman
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and other land reformers revised their philosophies only so far as
to admit that the entire domain was not suited for homesteading.
They were by no means alone in their stubborn idealism.
As new methods for reclaiming arid lands were discovered,
more land theoretically became available for the homestead settler.
In 1893, the editor of the Irrigation Age argued that irrigation
could facilitate the restoration of free settlement.

Small irriga

tion farms would "revive the charm of country life," and furnish
"a new outlet for the surplus population that has been passing for
generations from Eastern farms, cities and seaports to find homes
in the New W e s t . " ^
In contrast to this continued faith, John Wesley Powell
grew increasingly pessimistic over the prospect of stable communities
on the arid lands.

This pessimism was what most clearly distinguished

Powell from his contemporaries.

The severe drought and depopulation

of the Plains beginning in the late 1880s undoubtedly confirmed this
pessimism.

Powell came to accept the necessity of government regula

tion, not merely colonization for the settlement and development of
the W e s t . ^

Although government supervision of settlement was

certainly objectionable to traditional reformers, rationalizing the
pace of development was in agreement with their concept of the do
main as a sacred future trust.

It was the spokesmen of western de

velopment who vehemently protested Powell's plan to slow down and
regulate land disposal.

When Congress included a clause to temporarily

close the arid lands to further entry in an 1888 sundry appropriations
bill, the western interests fought it.

Western statesmen grilled

Powell in committee hearings and finally lifted the closure, passing
a counter measure to approve claims made during the two year moratorium.^
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Powell’s revisionism thus appeared to be less of a threat
to the ideals of reformers, who could conveniently cast aside the
substance of his programs in favor of his sympathetic motives,
than to the developers.

In this respect, Powell was at least

partially cloaked in Henry Nash Smith's '’imaginative veil" of the
yeoman farmer ideal.

Powell's breakthrough was simply to suggest

new modern answers to an old question:

How could the virtues of a

fluid nation of individual homes and stable communities best be
insured for the future?

Perhaps the imaginative veil was not

inherent in the answer, but in the ubiquitous question itself.

As

articulated by reformers, it implied the importance of free land
for settlers to the stability and prosperity of American society.
The inability to find an answer to satisfy reformers, developers
and revisionists was the rock upon which the safety valve vision in
Congress foundered.

Ill
Land reform idealism (and, hence, the safety valve) enjoyed
the widest unanimity in Congress when events heightened the concern
over the absence of free land or the eclipse of the small settler.
In the mid 1880’s, circumstances coincided which seemed to substan
tiate the gloomy prophecies of land reformers.

Labor and agricultural

discontent, another economic depression following the protracted
misery of the 1870s, and the revelation of a diminishing public
domain invited speculation over the effects of a closed domain.

The

1880 census provided the tangible link between the land question and
socio-economic dislocation.

For the first time, the Census Bureau

furnished statistics on farm tenancy in the United States.

The
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nation-wide rate of 25.6 percent confirmed the reformers’ worst
fears that the producer-settler was fast becoming the tenant-atwill.^^

Tenancy was, of course, antithetical to America's self-

image and was only one symptom that the United States was infected
with Old World maladies.

Few polemicists in the 1880s failed to

note these facts in their attacks on the growing inequal ity of
American life.

For land reformers, tenancy was both a symptom and

a cause of social ills.

Needless to say, it demanded a change in

land policy.
The problem of tenancy and landlordism was easily traceable
to the same incongruities in the land system that sparked the
railroad land grant controversy.

Indeed, the sale of unlimited

quantities of land by railroads, holders of land-grant college
and military bounty scrip was responsible for planting thousand acre
farms and ranches alongside 160 acre homesteads.

Also, America's

relative ignorance of its immense domain allowed cattle companies
to fence in thousands of unclaimed acres, excluding legitimate
homesteaders.

Large farms and ranches were both egregious examples

of land monopoly, but the "food factory" bonanza farms were parti
cularly revulsive to American values.

While many Americans reveled

in the economic might and efficiency of bonanza farms (especially
after they contributed to economic recovery in 1878-79), others
recognized immediately that they exploited seasonal labor and pre
vented the establishment of homes, churches, schools and other
symbols of "civilization."35

jn addition, large aggregations of

property were often divided, improved, and rented as tenant farms
in the image of English land tenure.
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As in the battle over railroad grants, however, it was
not these ideological objections to landlordism and illegal land
holding that produced effective results.

Rather, the close associa

tion of land monopolists and foreign corporate interests was the
main impetus for Congressional action.

Consequently, the movement

to restrict alien land holding eventually usurped the related issues
of illegal fencing and unlawful occupation of the public domain.
The high incidence of foreign ownership of offending corporations
accentuated the perceived evils of fencing and unauthorized occupa
tion.

In the debates over the 1885 anti-fencing bill, a chief

objection to fencing was the circumscription of individual oppor
tunity it caused.

Representative William "Pig Iron" Kelley, of

Pennsylvania, dramatized the fate of his impoverished urban con
stituents, and enjoined Congress to "interpose now and efficiently
to rescue what land it may for our laborers who are yet able to
escape from the growing poverty of the times to our hitherto free
lands."36

Poindexter Dunn, of Arkansas, echoed these sentiments,

contending that cattle companies "have closed and are rapidly closing
all the avenues to individual effort and enterprise, and soon there
will be left no hope to man except as the tenant, servant, or slave
of these insatiable and merciless cormorants."37
Because of the coincidence of social and economic troubles
and uproar over landlordism, Congress proved extremely receptive
to land reform principles in the mid 'eighties.

The House, led by

William Holman, gave the privilege to bills and resolutions intended
to facilitate disposal of agricultural land to actual settlers.^
But, aside from the anti-fencing and alien land holding restriction
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bills, little legislation passed Congress.

Several bills in the

House and Senate to prohibit outright the ownership of land by
corporations did not receive a floor hearing.

OQ

Several other

alien land holding bills received the support of committees, but
died of neglect.

Despite the declaration that landlordism (alien

or otherwise) was "incompatible with the best interests and free
institutions of the United S t a t e s , a

total prohibition of cor

porate land holding was also unacceptable.
This duality was salient in the passage of the alien land
holding restriction bill.

Not surprisingly, debate over this bill

invited clear juxtapositions of what was alien and what was American.
Indeed, the essence of the contemporary safety valve vision rested
on this contrast.

Proponents of the bill presented it as insurance

for maintaining individual opportunity and preventing the establish
ment of an American aristocracy.

Embraced in the report of Representa

tive Lewis Payson, the bill’s House sponsor, was almost every element
of the safety valve vision.

The original homestead principle, he

asserted, was "to aid the actual settler whose labor would make
the land fruitful and productive, giving added wealth to the locality,
and stability and strength to the country . . ."4-1

Threatening this

was the spectre of land monopoly and the eventual exhaustion of the
domain.

Finally, in a passage reminiscent of George Julian's earlier

speeches, Payson advocated that reclaiming land from alien monopolists
would
not only foster
. . . the home sentiment and individual
prosperity, . . . but, in addition, . . . there is no
greater safeguard against public disorder, tumults, and
riots than a generally distributed ownership of lands
and homes.
The bill became law, but did not exactly result in the wholesale
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reclamation of land for settlers.

Similar to the moderate railroad

forfeiture act, it sought to retain the benefits without the evils
of foreign

c a p i t a l .

in combating tenancy.

it succeeded more in soothing nativism than
Nevertheless, the alien land holding issue

generated the most explicit Congressional testimonies of faith
for the safety valve, and the widest public interest in any post
war land reform issue.

The coincidence of agricultural, labor,

land, and alien problems in a single issue seemed to threaten the
safety valve with extinction.

Such threats invariably drew wider

attention to the safety valve and made it a more compelling concept.

IV
Regardless of how confused the vision of a safety valve was
in the formulation of land policy, it was perfectly clear in Congres
sional rhetoric.

Free land could, if unimpeded by monopoly, insure

the stability of American institutions as well as individual mobility
and opportunity.

Land reformers considered the safety valve as an

adjunct to the homestead ideal and its Jeffersonian source, and a
gauge of American values.

Perhaps even more clear were the conse

quences of the absence of free land.

Free institutions would give

way to Old World ills, fluidity and mobility would be stultified,
prosperity would turn to widespread poverty, and harmony to strife.
Although it was not always certain whether Congressmen urged reform
as a present necessity or a future expedient, the most ardent re
formers felt that the vanguard of a Europeanized America had already
arrived.
The failure of land policy to embody this safety valve
vision reflected its ambitious, unequivocal idealism, as well as
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the incongruous land system.

Since the existence of some free

land did not qualify as an effective safety valve, the reformers'
concept of a safety valve obviously transcended a mere outlet.
Presumably, only the uncompromised reservation of arable land for
the settler could attain the social vision that comprised the safety
valve.

Only with the security of homesteads assured could free land

be of value to eastern society.

Because idealists made little

concerted effort to institute such fundamental reforms, it was in
evitable that land policy would not embody this safety valve.
The absence of fundamental reform contrasted sharply with
the ubiquity of reform rhetoric.

Although few Congressmen articu

lated a comprehensive ideology of land and society, many sincerely
adhered to the sanctity of the homestead settler.

This reverence

transcended the differences between idealists, interests of western
development and the new generation of revisionists heralded by
John Wesley Powell.
in longevity.

The support for the settler also extended far

The 1904-1905 Public Lands Commission, for instance,

sought, like its predecessor, to define and insure the rights of
homesteaders to the largest possible extent.

Also, reflecting the

conservationist context, it advised against the enlargement of
the Homestead to 640 acres, since it would controvert the original
principle.^

Along with the occasional currency given to the effects

of a closed frontier, these testimonials for the primacy of the
actual settler indicated the existence of Congressional sympathy
for land reform principles.

Despite this sympathy, Congress often

produced ineffective or self-defeating reform legislation.
The solution to this enigma may lie in the dual vision of
the Homestead Act that existed from the Congressional perspective.

It was unlikely that Congress as a whole legislated for the settler
envisioned by Julian, Holman and Payson.

Instead,

the settler as

chief agent of development more than as the epitome and bulwark of
American ideals predominated in the formulation of p o l i c y . T h e
former conception shared with the latter the belief that the settler
was a source of prosperity, but was not restricted by the devotion
to homestead idealism.

Thus, the homestead could exist alongside

the corporation and work effectively towards the national good.
Because this more utilitarian concept of the settler obviously
guided Congressional action,

the safety valve and its ideological

connotation was a dissenting voice in land legislation.

Neverthe

less, it sobered enthusiasm for the generous bestowal of land to
developers, contributed to the concern for the actual settler, and,
perhaps most importantly,

formulated a compelling warning on the

consequences of the inaccessibility of the public lands.
The failure of land policy to embody the safety valve re
inforced the urgency of these prophecies.

It also contributed to

the general acknowledgement that the safety valve did not produce
the benefits it was supposed to.

Because it did not insure the

accessible, inexhaustible domain on which the safety valve was
contingent, public land policy was an obvious target for criticism
from all segments of American life.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

^Paiil W. Gates, "The Homestead Law in An Incongruous Land
System," American Historical Review (henceforth AHR) 41 (July 1936):
52-68.
2Commons, et. al., History, vol. I., p. 526:
speech of
Rep. John F. Driggs, Congressional Globe, 40/2, p. 2382.
^All party platforms included land reform planks by 1872.
Kirk H. Porter, ed., National Party Platforms (New York:
The
MacMillan Company, 1924), passim; James D. Richardson, ed., A Com
pilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington,
D.C.; Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1905), vol. vii, p.
152, vol. viii, pp. 308-9.
^Mary E. Young, "Congress Looks West:
Liberal Ideology
and Public Land Policy in the Nineteenth Century," The Frontier In
American Development, David M. Ellis, ed.
(Ithaca:
Cornell Univer
sity Press, 1969), pp. 54, 110 and passim; Henry Nash Smith, Virgin
Land (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 123-144.
5Leo Marx, in Machine in the Garden (New York:
Oxford
University Press,1964), pp. 128-30, 143, asserts that unlike some
of his disciples, Jefferson considered rural virtue an ideal type
only; Patrick W. Riddleberger, George Washington Julian Radical
Republican (Indianapolis:
Indiana Historical Bureau, 1966), pp. 296,
321; and Israel George Blake, The Holmans of Veraestau (Oxford, Ohio:
The Mississippi Valley Press, 1943), pp. 109, 232, attribute to their
subjects antiquated or Jeffersonian values.
^Speech of 29 January 1851 and 6 March 1868 in George W.
Julian, Speeches on Political Questions (New York:
Hurd and Houghton,
1872; repr. ed., Westport:
Negro Universities Press, 1970), pp. 59* 371.
^Ibid., pp. 54-55; George W. Julian, "Our Land Policy,"
Atlantic Monthly, March 1879, p. 336.
®"The New Trials of American Democracy," reprinted in The
(Chicago) Workingman's Advocate (henceforth WMA) , 27 September 1873,
4 October 1873, 11 October 1873.
^David M. Ellis, "The Homestead Clause in Railroad Land Grants,"
Ellis, ed., Frontier, pp. 48-49; for the most comprehensive single work
on land grants, see John Bell Sanborn, "Congressional Grants in Aid of
Railways," University of Wisconsin Economics, Political Science and
History Series, v. 2, no. 3 (Madison:
Univ. of W ise., 1891).

48

49
10CG, 40/2, p. 97.
H l b i d . , 41/2, p.

424.

12ibid., 41/2, p.

2095.

l^ibid., 41/2, appendix, pp. 113-115; for similar resolutions
and bills, see J2G, 40/2, pp. 637, 2380-86, 4428.
14Ibid., 41/2, pp. 3105-3107.
^ I b i d . , 41/2, p. 2361.
^ I b i d . , 41/2, Appendix, pp. 310-314.
•^David Maldwyn Ellis, "The Forfeiture of Railroad Land
Grants, 1867-1894," MVHR 33 (June 1946):
27-60; Harold H. Dunham,
Government Handout (Ph.D. dissertation, 1941; repr. ed., New York:
De Capo
Press, 1970), pp. 80-100;"Forfeiture ofCertain
Lands,"
House Report 1426, 52d Congress, 1st session, 1892, p. 1 called
the 1890 act "a mere subterfuge which amounted to nothing as com
pared with the area involved and subject to forfeiture."
l^For a complete summary of Homestead amendments, see Daniel
M. Greene, ed., Public Land Statutes of the United States (Washington,
D.C.:
GPO, 1931), p. 157-223.
^ " E n l a r g e m e n t

Qf Homestead Rights," House Report 3211, 49/1,

1886, p. 2.
20"Homestead Entry," House Report 860, 50/2, 1888, p. 1.
2^Speech of Rep, Thomas C. McRae, 16 March 1896, Congressional
Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 28, pt. 3, p. 2841 (henceforth,
C R : volume: part: page); "Free Homesteads on the Public Lands For
Actual and Bona Fide Settlers," Senate Report 5, 55/1, 1897.
22David M. Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands (Lincoln: Univer
sity of Nebraska Press, 1971), pp. 128-161.
23y. b . Hazen, "The Great Middle Region of the United States
and Its Limited Space of Arable Land," North American Review (hence
forth NAR) , January 1875, pp. 1, 26-27.
24-Smith, Virgin, pp. 196-200.
Smith's work remains the best
study of the image of the West, and there is little in this thesis
to quarrel with him. The nature of his study, however, stresses the
idealism surrounding the safety valve over the clear perception of
its impotence.
O C

J . W. Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of
the United States (Washington, D*C.:
GPO, 1878), pp. 27-29.
26Ibid., p. 41; see also John Wesley Powell, "Institutions
the Arid Lands," Century Magazine, May 1890, pp. 111-112.

For

50
^ T h o m a s Donaldson, "The Public Lands in the United States,"
N A R , August 1881, pp. 209-210; United States Public Lands Commission,
Report of the Public Lands Commission (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1880),
pp* xxx, lxix; a German colony petitioned in vain to Congress in
1870 for a colony land grant, reprinted in James F. Willard and Colin
B. Goodykoontz, Colorado Historical Collections, vol. 3: Experiments
in Colorado Colonization (Boulder: Univ. of Colorado, 1926), pp. 34-36.
28Report of Public Lands, pp. xxii-xxiii.
29jbid., p. xxviii.
30"Disposal of Public Lands," House Report 778, 50/1, 1888,

p. 6.
31william E. Smythe, "The Irrigation Idea and its Coming Con
gress ," Reyiew_of_^ayie^, September 1893, pp. 400-401; see also C. H.
Lugrin, "A National Problem," Arena, January 1904, p. 226.
^ W a l l a c e Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, Co., 1954), p. 308.
33ibid., pp. 318, 329, 331.
34U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth
Census of the United States, vol. V: Agriculture (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1913), pp. 122-127.
35"Bonanza Farms in the West," Atlantic Monthly, January 1880,
pp. 41-44; Humphrey J. Desmond, "The Last Resort of the Landless,"
Forum, November 1888, pp. 324-325; Thomas Gill, "Landlordism in
America," NAR, January 1886, p. 53; see also William A. Williams The
Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York:
Random House, 1969),
pp. 206-236.
36CR: 15:5:4774.
37ibid., pp. 4781-4782.
38 c r : 15:1:546-551.
39CR: 17:1:534; 19:1:229, 2134.
^0"Land Titles to Aliens in the United States," House Report
2308, 48/2, 1885, p. 1.
“ ------^ " Ownership of Realestate in the Territories," House Report
3455, 49/1, 1886, p. 1.
-------------

^xbid.
/^
Roger V. Clements, British Investments and American Legisla
tion Restrictions in the Trans-Mississippi West," MVHR 42 (September
1955): 225-227.
----

51
^ U n i t e d States Public Lands Commission, Report of the Public
Lands Commission (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1905; repr. ed., New York:
The Arno Press, 1972), pp. xiii-xv; this concern for the settler
was hardly anachronistic, since more Homestead entries were made
in 1910 than any other year.
Louise E. Peffer, The Closing of the
Public Domain (Stanford:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 145-148.
^ L a w r e n c e B. Lee, "The Homestead Act:
Vision and Reality,"
Utah Historical Quarterly 30(Suramer 1962): 220-222; Peffer, Closing,
p. 339, noted that conservationists and western developers continued
this dual image into the twentieth century.

CHAPTER III
PRODUCERS VS. MONOPOLISTS:
WORKINGMEN, LAND REFORM
AND THE SAFETY VALVE

In the theoretical construct of a safety valve, the exist
ence of free land is the requisite element and labor the primary
beneficiary.

Following from this, in the late nineteenth century,

the failure of public land policy to embody the safety valve vision
reinforced a concern for the land question within the larger sphere
of labor reform.

Post-war labor reform inherited the natural

rights based ideology of the Jacksonian era, and agitated for
the same causes as Congressional land reformers.

Although the land

issue was, for most workingmen, ancillary to other more immediate
ones, reformist labor spokesmen insisted on the centrality of land
to the condition of the laborer.

The wide variety of explanations

by economic theorists and labor spokesmen on the relation between
land and labor, however, took into account workers' paramount
interest in their immediate conditions.
The nature of the land-labor link was, in the main, abstract
and not contingent upon the emigration of workingmen to the public
domain.

There was a noticeable paucity of concern for the actual

mechanism of emigration, inviting the conclusion that the labor
safety valve was a passive one.

On only a few occasions did labor

organizations develop schemes for emigration to the land, and these
were rarely carried out.

Actual emigration wasj instead, subordinate

to the re-establishment of opportunity for emigration.
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The process
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of men taking advantage of their birthright to the' soil was implicit
in an ideal social order in which no obstacles stood between the
individual and the land.

Not coincidentally, the restoration of

such an ideal society was the paramount objective of the larger
labor reform movement.

It was in the struggle to restore to labor

its natural opportunities that the safety valve vision was most
salient from labor's intellectual perspective.
The post-war situation confronted American labor with
serious threats to its economic condition and social status.

A

perceived growing chasm in inequality between the privileged and
the worker compounded the already strong resentment of "monopoly."
The natural rights theory attributed these evils to the perversion
of the natural order of society and the denial to labor of its
natural opportunities.

Because the right to the soil was chief

among these opportunities, the ineffectiveness of the safety valve
became part of labor's case against "capital."

But, the ineffective

safety valve was only one element in the dislocations of industrial
society and only one explanation for the degradation of the laborer.
Land monopoly was among a litany of crimes attributed to the oppres
sors of "the producing classes."

All of these charges delivered

at capital focused on the alleged theft from labor of its proper
share of the wealth, and the enslavement of workers to a compulsory
wage system.

The interest of organized labor in the land question

was thus inseparable from these general grievances.
This specific relevance of the land question to the worker
contributed to the passivity of the labor safety valve.

Land reform,

to be compelling, had to guarantee the amelioration of the workers'
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condition as wage earners, and not simply as potential settlers.
The implied necessity of some workers going to the soil, as opposed
to the dependence upon migration to thin out the labor supply, sub
ordinated actual emigration to opportunity, and prevented the safe
ty valve from becoming a mere agrarian emulation of farm life.
Reformist labor spokesmen, even while encouraging emigration,
realized that most wage-earners could not or would not leave their
occupations and become farmers.

Consequently, those schemes for

emigration actually formulated usually included appeals for financial
aid or plans for colonization, both of which were strategies account
ing for the impediments to emigration.

An even more common result

was the statement of the land question as an issue somehow providen
tial to the immediate condition of the wage-earner.
Throughout the post-war era, labor spokesmen emphasized
land as a gauge for the freedom and independence of the worker.

It

was a canon of belief that total monopolization of the land would
force workers to sell their labor cheaply and on the terms of their
employer.

Whether labor reformers fought land monopoly as a tactic

to abolish the wage system is a debatable point.

William Sylvis,

Terence Powderly and other prominent spokesmen explicitly desired
the co-operation of labor and capital in the same hands, but often
acted more for the improvement, not the abolition of wages.

Abolition

of the wage system, it will be seen, became an increasingly unrealistic
demand and somewhat superfluous to improving workers1 conditions.
Nevertheless, there was no ambiguity in the belief that land monopoly
portended the oppression of labor and the establishment of a social
order antithetical to America's free institutions.

Exponents of land reform pursued at least two lines of
reasoning in their rationalization of land’s relevance for workers.
In the first, land was, under free conditions, the last resort for
the dissatisfied worker or the man who desired to become his own
employer.

Invariably, this "outlet" function for the land was

coupled with ideological overtones of labor's rights, and the effec
tive subversion of them by land monopoly.

For example, labor editor

and patriarch John Swinton, who had emigrated to Kansas in the 1850s,
observed the monopoly, unemployment, immigration, and labor violence
on the 1890s and mused that "there would still be hope for everybody
if good land were-* as it was in the days not far off, within every
b o d y ’s r e a c h . S e c o n d l y ,

reformers stated the significance of

land to labor by the implications of its absence.

The permanent

subordination of labor to capital, the unmitigated impact of laborsaving machinery and immigrant competition, and the rise of an
American aristocracy were all raised as inevitable results of an
exhausted or inaccessible domain.
Significantly, both of these explanations of land's relevance
for labor focused on the actual impotence of the safety valve.

Al 

though reformers never surrendered to a new "unnatural" order, they
clearly perceived that the natural order, of which the safety valve
was an integral element, had broken down.

Because the safety valve

was both a part of the natural order and a mechanism for its insur
ance, the crises facing the safety valve and the crises facing labor
were intimately related.
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In the wake of the Civil War, American labor again became
a more active and militant force in the social and political arena.
While pure and simple unionism, with its strategy of wage conscious
ness and immediate objectives would grow predominant in the post
war decades, the reformist tradition remained strong within a broadbased movement known generically as Labor Reform.

The principles

of Labor Reform were remarkably consistent despite their application
by city and state trade assemblies, radical intellectuals, farmer
organizations, and a few trade unions.

The philosophical foundation

for the movement was summarized by an 1868 resolution of the Nation
al Labor Congress Executive Board:

"Resolved, that the producing

classes, agricultural, mining, mechanical, intellectual and moral,
are the most important portions of all communities; and that all
distributors, financiers and statesmen, together with their aids,
civil and military, are of secondary importance . . ."2

The

goal of Labor Reform, stated simply, was the reassertion of the
proper relationship between producers and non-producers.

American

labor leaders, it sould be noted, unlike their European Marxist
counterparts, did not believe that this would be achieved as the
violent culmination of a long historical process, but as the simple
readjustment of laws and institutions to an assumed, pre-existent,
natural order.

Labor Reform spokesmen attempted to convince workers

of the solidarity of the producing classes.

An 1866 editorial in

the Workingman's Advocate, the primary organ of the movement, stressed
that " a

wrong done to one is a wrong done to the whole, and must

be understood and so treated if we ever obtain our rights."3

The

movement's objectives reflected this all-inclusive vision of the
fate of producers.
Labor Reform stressed the relevance of the land question,
currency reform, co-operatives, and the eight-hour day to all
workers largely because of this broad ideology.

In addition, the

land question fit squarely into the producer-nonproducer dichotomy
because it was considered an element in the improper balance of
forces.

Labor Reform attributed salient social and economic

inequality to "class legislation," oppressive organizations of
capital, and the Old World tendency toward aggregated wealth.

The

public land system, by fostering land monopolies, created all these
evils.

Consequently, the Labor Reform movement advocated land

reform, often echoing Congressional land reformers and rallying
round their standards.

In particular, the struggle against rail

road land grants caught the attention of Labor Reformers.
Spokesmen and journals lambasted the evils of corporations "stealing
the public lands and--especially as illustrated in the 1868-69
Cherokee Neutral Tract incident--driving settlers from their homes
with Government consent.^
The National Labor Union (NLU), the chief organizational
embodiment of Labor Reform between 1866 and 1870, gave consistent
support to land reform in its annual platform.

The NLU resolved

that Congress had no right to grant the public lands to corporations
and that the domain was a "sacred trust" to be parceled out to
actual settlers only.

Continued monopolization of the land, warned

the 1869 platform, would result in "the subversion of free institu
tions, as also the social and political well-being of the laboring
masses.
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The NLU's declarations on land reform owed much to William
H. Sylvis, who was, until his death in July 1869, the key figure
in the International Iron Molder's Union and the NLU.

Sylvis

often expressed almost agrarian sentiments for the virtues of
life on the soil, and was steeped in the natural rights tradition.
"Wherever we find the land in the hands of the few," he wrote in
1868, "we find the masses of people reduced to poverty and want;
and wherever we find the rights and principles of the people equal,
and the land divided fairly amoung all, we find prosperity, content
ment and h a p p i n e s s . O n other occasions, Sylvis stressed the
opportunity to emigrate as a measure of workers'

freedom.

He struck

a note of monopolistic conspiracy in an 1867 speech to Boston work
ingmen:

"Capital feels unsafe waging war against labor so long as

workingmen have access to the land.
of it and thus cut off all retreat."7

The object is to get possession
Perhaps the best summary of

Sylvis's philosophy was expressed in an 1869 editorial:
The Land is God's Bank and the only cheques upon it which
are honored are those drawn by the hands of Labor . . . .
Wisely used, its funds are inexhaustible for any amount
properly withdrawn increases rather than lessens its wealthproducing power . . . . The best interests of the community
yet demands that those laborers who are best able to per
form such duties, should now use the land fully for the
common good of us all.8
Land monopoly thus denied men their natural opportunities.

It was,

in other words, another nail in the coffin of the proud, independent
worker who was a dying species in industrial America.

The objective

of land reform was to provide the opportunity for emigration--an
exercise of the worker's freedom--and preserve that critical link
between land and labor on which the status of the worker and the
prosperity of the nation depended.

Aside from Sylvis, the NLU and the larger Labor Reform move
ment mustered wide support for land reform.

The NLU's emphasis on

producer solidarity invited diverse interests, including farmers
and agrarian reformers, into its ranks.

The Union's official

organ monitored the establishment of the Washington, D.C. "Pre-emptor'
Union, and the New York Free Land League Committee.

The latter organi

zation, sponsored by the multifarious Frenchman, George Francis Train,
developed a "Workingmen's Free Land Chart" which anticipated the
placing of all land in the hands of cultivators by 1900.9

Despite

the quirks of each group, all adhered to the fundamental principles
that no corporation should get between Congress and the settler,
and that land properly belonged only to the laborer who gave it
v a lue.
Another strain of Labor Reform was the intellectual utopian
ism of the Connecticut, later the New England, and National Labor
Reform League.

Labor historian David Montgomery has dubbed this

collection of well-known activists "sentimentalists" whose alliance
with the NLU pushed the latter towards a "higher and holier than all
1Q
trade unions" philosophy.

The Reform League shared with the NLU

the producing class rhetoric and natural rights theory, and held to
an even stronger condemnation of "usury. "H-

By 1873, when the NLU

had already perished, the Reform League went as far as to declare
that all property in land was wrong and must be abolished before
the producing classes could be ascendant.

12

The chief land theorist for the Reform League was Joshua K.
Ingalls, a self-styled philosophical anarchist who was one of the
original ante-bellum National R e formers.^

Ingalls presented his
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views before the 1883 Senate Committee exploring the relations of
labor and capital, and in an 1885 tract, Social Wealth.

Testifying

before the Senate committee, Ingalls represented the National Land
Reform Association, which was in spirit and substance, George Henry
Evans1 NRA.

The Association's memorial called for the reservation

of the public lands for homesteads only and reiterated the appeal
for ownership based solely on occupancy.^

In presenting the

Association's demands, Ingalls articulated the philosophical as
sumptions of Labor Reform:

"Only a return to natural law, a scien

tific adjustment of the primal agents in production, land and labor,
and the restoration of man to his natural environment, and freedom
of action therein can effect any salutory change
of capital and labor) ."15

[in the relations

Ingalls' personal philosophy became a

total hostility to ownership in property.

In Social Wealth, he

reiterated the premises of man's common birthright to land, and
land as the basis of all wealth, and concluded:

"Ownership of

land is sovereignty over the domain and whoever owns the land upon
which a people live and toil is their sovereign and ruler."

16

Al

though Ingalls harbored fundamental disagreements with Henry George's
theories, his work recalled agrarian antecedents and was similar to
George's a n alysis.^

Both theorists

agreed on what workers would

lose should access to land fall beyond their grasp.
Agrarianism, or the utopian vision of communitarian life on
the soil, was by no means dead in the post-war decades.

William

West, Lewis A. Hine, Joseph R. Buchanan, Lewis Masquerier, and NRA
co-founder Thomas A. Devyr continued to propagate their ideas.

Hine

presented a minority report on the NLU's 1868 platform, dissenting
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from the statement that the money monopoly was the "parent" of all
others.

The root of all monopoly, he asserted, was "in the soil,"

and money would always be oppressive so long as there was land
monopoly.

18

Masquerier wrote an 1877 polemic worshipping George

Henry Evans and illustrating the feasibility of township democracies
for industrializing America; Thomas Devyr and Joseph Buchanan were
more guarded in their statements that utopian communities could
provide remedies for industrial maladies.

19

The influence of agrarianism was not directly felt in post
war land reform.

Instead, reformers emulated the independence of

farm life and the virtues of egalitarian communities without advo
cating their establishment.

This indirect influence could be seen

in the work of Edward T. Peters, whose pivotal writings harkened back
to Evans, anticipated Henry George, and resembled the contemporary
idealism of Congressmen Julian and Holman.

In an 1870 lecture, Peters

joined the attack on railroad grants, pleading the case of the "poor
man" who may some day wish to claim his inheritance.

,fWhere is it

that we chiefly find dependence and servility," he asked
but among the landless poor of our great cities furthest
away from our public domain? . . . Reserved as homes for
the masses,
the public lands are a guarantee for physi
cal comfort, intelligence, self-respect and true manly and
womanly character in millions of our people, and through
those things they are a guarantee for the performance of
our republican institutions.
On the other hand, if turned
over to the ownership of vast monopolies, they will consti
tute the greatest danger to our freedom as a nation.20
Peters, however, entertained doubts whether simply reserving the
lands, or even workmen becoming farmers was a sufficient safety valve
for an ideal society.

He expressed these doubts at the 1870 NLU

Congress when he suggested an alternative to the Union's usual land
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resolution.

He proposed the reservation of one-fourth of all

remaining land for artisans and mechanics; rather than becoming
farmers and thus surrendering their livelihood, these men would
obtain enough land to pursue their trades profitably.

Critics

denounced Peter's’ plan as "purely agrarianism" (which was hardly
91
accurate) and overwhelmingly defeated it. i
Still later, in a series of 1871 articles, Peters found a
new relevance of land for workers in the theories of John Stuart
Mill.

Peters again stressed the insufficiency of reserving farm

land for potential settlers, and further noted the irreversible
urbanization of the United States.

Concluding that the public lands

would be of little value to the urban masses as long as there was
private property in land, Peters espoused M i l l ’s "unearned increment"
theory of land rent and a land tax that Henry George would soon
22
popularize.
Peters’

skepticism on the relevance of land reform to the

urban laborer was not uncommon.

He did not repudiate the theoretical

basis of land and labor reform, but sought a more tangible link.

As

the Labor Reform movement succumbed to the depression of 1873-79,
the attractiveness of its philosophical foundation also suffered.
The depression underscored the vulnerability of workingmen to
economic dislocation and re-emphasized the primacy of wages and
conditions.

Although land reform continued to be a salient concern

for labor reformers, workingmen found it most compelling in terms
of their immediate demands.

The experiences of Terence Powderly

and the Knights of Labor illustrated this emerging tendency.
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The Knights of Labor inherited the philosophical position
of the pre-depression Labor Reform movement and with it (or despite
it) carried the American labor movement to its apogee of power up
to that time.

The Knights, like the NLU, had an all-inclusive

"producer11 membership, but, unlike the NLU, was in its early years
an effective organ of trade union interests.^3

After several

successfully-prosecuted strikes in 1885 swelled its membership with
rural producers and unskilled labor, the trade union presence de
clined, sapping its strength.

Most eventually bolted to the newly-

organized rival, the American Federation of Labor (AF of L ) .

The

Knights then drifted into the hands of a militantly anti-trade
clique,

became the industrial appendage of the National Farmer's

Alliance and Industrial Union, and began a slow death into the 1890s.
The split made permanent and institutionalized the long-standing
schism in American labor between reformist and pure and simple
unionism.

Thus, the Knights of Labor was from its inception an

unstable balance between broad reformist principles and trade unions
concerned with ameliorating conditions within the existing wage
system.
Terence Powderly, who presided over the Knights from 1879
to 1893, personified this duality and endured its consequences.
Historians have criticized Powderlyfs leadership as vacillating and
out of step with the movement he led.

0/

Although he was by no means

inimical to the trade unions which formed the initial core of the
Knights, Powderly's anti-strike philosophy and overall passivity
was anachronistic in the militant 1880s.

Powderly shared with Labor

Reformers a vision of the solidarity and the supremacy of the pro
ducing classes, yet often resigned himself to the expedients of working
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within the existing system.

Powderly was perhaps a tragic transi

tional figure, whose role as Grand Master Workman of the Knights
was often no more than a faint voice of conscience.

Among the

reform causes he championed, temperance, co-operation and the land
question were paramount.

Although the Knights occasionally acquiesced

in adopting measures reflecting Powderly’s views, his tenure was
usually spent in frustrated effort to make the land question com
pelling for workers.
Powderly exhausted the supply of theoretical explanations
why the status of land was significant for labor.

He often gave

consideration to the prospect of assisting the unemployed to the
land, but could not overcome his own doubts of its feasibility (see
part III, this chapter).

He was a consistent advocate of natural

rights doctrine and a firm believer that land monopoly directly
impacted on the condition of the urban wage-earner.
With these rationalizations, Powderly was entirely consis
tent with the principles ostensibly guiding the Knights of Labor.
The Knights, in their secret and ritualistic first decade, had
adopted the reformist, preamble of the defunct Industrial Brotherhoods.
The first important General Assembly in 1878 endorsed this preamble
which embodied the producer vs. monopolist mentality.

Included in

the preamble was a demand for the reservation of public lands for
actual settlers.

In his book, Thirty Years of Labor, Powderly

rationalized the inclusion of this (modest) land reform resolution:
"It was not that there was a dread of scarcity of land that this
demand was made . . .

it briefly expressed the sentiments of those

who endeavored to attract the attention of the wage workers to greater

65
issues than the wage

q u e s t i o n .

"25

Powderly continued his effort

to draw attention to higher issues, expecially co-operation and
land reform, in later addresses to the Knights General Assemblies.
His reverence for the independent producer and association
of land with the survival of this ideal was at the core of his
plaintive appeals for attention to the land question.

In urging

the land question as the "all-absorbing" issue around which all
others revolved, he told the 1882 Assembly that "if I ever come to
believe in individual ownership in land, I must, in order to be
consistent, believe that the man who owns the land owns the
people who live on it as

w e l l .

"26

Land monopoly, he warned, would

enslave even the wage-earner at home and render the labor question
"harder of solution than it is at present.
The land reform planks which the Knights did adopt were,
in contrast to Powderly's urgency, moderate and non-binding.

They

were in fact the same demands that were ubiquitous in political
platforms and public opinion and did not incite the Knights to
activism until 1886.

At that time, the Knights became involved in

the most popular land reform movement, the campaign against alien
landlordism.

At the Cleveland General Assembly in February 1886,

the Knights established a three man lobby in Washington, and the
Special Committee on Legislation recommended a plethora of land
reform causes.

The lobby worked for an end to tenancy, reservation

of land for settlers, taxation of land held in parcels over 160
acres, forfeiture of railroad grants and unpatented lands, removal
of fences from the public domain, and restriction of alien ownership
in the territories.

28

In addition, the Knights spearheaded a mass pet

ition campaign for the restriction of alien ownership.^

66
This burst of political activity coincided not only with
nation-wide agitation over landlordism, but also with the transi
tion of the Knights into a less pure and simple, more politicized
organization.

The "Great Upheaval" of 1885-1886 diluted the strength

of the Knights’ trade union membership and was followed by a polariza
tion of reformist and pure and simple unionism.

The pure and simple

bodies deliberately excluded attention to the land question.

As

Samuel Gompers told an 1882 convention of the Federation of Trade
and Labor Unions, the land question did not control wages; wages
controlled everything else.

30

The activity of the Knights, in con

trast, was less wage conscious than before.

In this light, it

does not seem likely that the 1886 land reform campaigns represented
the sudden acceptance of Powderly's rationale for the primacy of
the land question.

In fact, Powderly commented repeatedly in later

years on the opposition with which he always contended in his
efforts to "take advanced ground on the question of land monopoly."
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II
The labor upheavals of the late 1870s and 1880s, in conjunction
with the salience of landlordism, reinvigorated land and labor theory.
Although the new wave of theory was consistent with the natural rights
tradition and still reflected classical economic origins, it was
clearly applicable to an urban-industrial context.

In this sense,

the works of Henry George and his contemporaries were more compelling
to the wage-earner.

George's Progress and Poverty was the focal point

for discussion of the land question after 1880, and even when other
reform theorists dissented from his remedies, as many did, they could
not escape his analysis.
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Of George's contemporaries, William Godwin Moody was perhaps
the most noteworthy.

In 1879 Moody traveled extensively throughout

the West, building a case against the evils of land monopoly.

His

1883 tract, Land and Labor in the United States was influential
and his testimony before the 1883 Senate Committee on Education and
Labor reappeared in government reports throughout the decade.

Moody

traced the problems of labor to a conspiratorial coincidence of
technological unemployment, cheap immigrant labor and land monopoly
which created a suicidal competition for employment among workers.
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He was particularly critical of the bonanza farms of the Red River
Valley which, he asserted, drove small farmers out of markets and
denied opportunity to thousands of would-be producer-settlers
Rather than emphasizing the inaccessibility of land to workers, Moody
believed that land monopoly drove small farmers into the pestilent,
overcrowded cities, thus compounding the workers' plight.

Land

reform, achieved by proliferating smaller parcels of land, would
encourage mass return to the farm and properly redistribute natural
opportunities.
While Moody warned of land monopoly "planting upon our soil
a social system that is in utter and direct conflict with all our
institutions," W. A. Phillips in Land, Labor and Law (1886) detailed
the effect of monopoly from antiquity to the insidious establishment
of an American

a r i s t o c r a c y . ^

Both polemicists envisioned a safety

valve that would restore to labor its natural opportunities and,
hence, its proper position superior to capital.

In his remedies

for the oppression of labor, Phillips clearly reflected classical
economic as well as natural rights sources:

"Free facility ought to
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be given for the exchange of occupation, as a necessary condition
of independence, and any man should be able to cultivate his share
of the soil when he desired to do s o . " ^

Conversely, he assigned

the impoverishment of the working class to two causes which impeded
operation of free laws:
accumulated capital.^

land monopoly and usurious profits of
Together they robbed the worker of his

natural opportunities and portended cataclysmic change for America.
Like many of his contemporaries, including Frederick Jackson Turner,
Phillips pondered the impact of a wholly appropriated
public domain:

(or monopolized)

"When all unoccupied land is taken and a dense popula

tion confronts us, the lines of society will grow more inflexible
and the disparity of condition will be greater and more clearly
defined."

Such a situation would result in either:

1) the destruc

tion of popular freedom; 2) the finding of peaceful remedies to
secure perfect equality and rights; or 3) the overthrow of the
aristocracy by anarchy and violence.
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For Phillips, if an effec

tive safety valve did not aid in restoring a naturally ordered
society,

drastic change was inevitable.
Henry George, like Moody and Phillips, combined classical

economics and natural rights perspectives on land and labor reform
with an appreciation for the problems of an urban-industrial society.
There is a temptation to view George's theories as an innovative
departure from those of his predecessors.

His ideas, though, were

clearly consistent with those of Sylvis, Powderly and others who
tried to draw tangible links between the land and labor problems.
George also saw in his remedies to the land problem the fulfillment
of a larger social vision.

His apparent modernity rose from the
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application of his theories to urban property and his concern with
socially-generated inequality.
improve the masses' conditions.

His doctrines suggested cures to
Because this improvement rose from

the readjustment in the relations between labor and nonproducers
and the weakening of economic middlemen, George fit squarely in
the reformist current that propounded the labor safety valve.
In a restatement of Labor Reform philosophy, George wrote
in 1887:

"That what is called the labor question is simply another

name for the land question;

that all ills which labor suffers

spring from the appropriation as private property of the element without
which labor is useless— becomes evident upon any honest attempt to trace
OQ
these ills to their s o u r c e s . G e o r g e differed from most of his
antecedents (save notably Edward T. Peters) in his explanation of
this relationship.

In Our Land and Land Policy (1871) and more

explicitly in his seminal work, Progress and Poverty (1879).

George

confirmed the suspicions that land and labor faced a common threat.
He argued that rent from speculative land holding absorbed all of
society's material progress, depressed profits and wages, and caused
the frequent (and, hence, avoidable) "paroxysms" of industry.

Fol

lowing from this, the cure for all social ills was the confiscation
of rent for benevolent use by the state via what became known as
the "single t a x . " ^
George's doctrines served as a touchstone for all contempor
ary land and labor theory and were often misrepresented.

Many

labeled the single tax a measure for the nationalization of the
land--an alternative George denounced in Progress and Poverty. ^
The 1883 Senate Committee on the relations of labor and capital
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asked many of its witnesses their opinions of George's ideas and
grilled George himself in extended interrogation.

In his testimony,

George spoke of land monopoly in terms of the ability of workers
to employ themselves and in terms of the level of wages.

He,

like his predecessors, obviously emulated the independent producer,
yet recognized the primacy of wages to most workers.

In clarifying

the relation between land and wages, he borrowed from both the natur
al rights tradition and classical economics:
Where there is free access to the soil wages in any employ
ment cannot sink lower than that which, upon an average,
a man can make by applying himself to the soil--to those
natural opportunities of labor which it affords. When
the soil is monopolized and free access to it ceases, the
wages may be driven to the lowest point on which labor
can l i v e . ^
In developing his doctrines, George considered land in the
abstract form, but he applied his ideas to the status of America’s
public domain.

Monopoly on the public domain and in California was

in fact a wellspring for his initial analysis.

His pronouncements

on the inevitable results of unreformed land policy echoed Julian
and Holman and anticipated Frederick Jackson Turner.

George articu

lated a clear vision of what free land meant for American society.
In 1871, he wrote that America had striven to be wealthy and great
through administration of its public lands.

"But will it be as

great in all that constitutes true greatness?" he asked.
/Q
be such a good country for the poor man?" J

"Will it

Rather than the mindless

munificence which had characterized land policy, George recommended
that the land be distributed to actual settlers only in 40-80 acre
parcels which, he believed, should "give every man an opportunity of
employing his own labor.
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In later years, he became decidedly pessimistic in his
appraisals of land policy and emphasized the need for retrenchment.
Besides affirming the existence of a serious tenancy problem in an
1886 article, he warned of the increased pressures in American
cities, especially from immigration, with the near-exhaustion of
the d o m a i n . ^

in progress and Poverty, he cited the existence of

the open domain as contributing to "{alll that we are proud of in
the American character, all that makes our conditions and institu
tions better than those of older countries . . . "

With the domain

nearly gone, George concluded, 11(t] he republic has entered upon a
new era, an era in which the monopoly of land will tell with
U f i

accelerating effect.,,H'0
George's concept of land was, however, all-inclusive and
his analysis applicable to much more than the public lands.

He

adhered to the conception of land as common.property, and defined
it as "all natural opportunities or f

o r

c

e

s

was this phrase

of course, and not simply "the public lands" that dominated labor
and land reform in the nineteenth century.

George's theories

proved more politically influential in regard to urban property
holding and most popular in Great Britain.

In the 1880s and 1890s,

a broad-based "single tax movement," which attracted intellectuals
and reformers, propagated his theories.

Adherents to the movement

advocated that the paramount benefit of the single tax solution was
the elimination of inequality.

Land, in the abstract connotation,

represented all opportunity, and its monopolization caused all involuntary poverty.
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The consistency of this reasoning with natural

rights theory should be evident.

B. 0. Flower's journal, the A rena,
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was virtually a single tax organ in the 1890s and early 1900s.
number of writers associated single tax reform with the

A

re-establish

ment of a nation of independent producers and the elimination of
"Old World" t e nancy.^
By applying George's doctrines to an urban-industrial con
text, the single tax movement was not always circumscribed by
traditional safety valve concerns.

For example, S. B. Riggen

defended the relevance of the single tax for the urbanite in 1894
by denying the necessity of emigration.

The single tax (applied

to urban property as well as western monopolies) did not anticipate
the transformation of artisans, mechanics and professional men into
agriculturalists,

he clarified.

"It would simply result in a natural

and free subdivision of Labor, wherein each person could choose the
kind of employment for which he was best suited or qualified, and
in which he saw the best opportunity for promoting individual welfare."-^
This of course had been the position of Edward Peters in 1870 and
was an adaptation of the safety valve to the urban, "closed frontier"
world of the 1890s.

Similarly, Louis Post, George's later-life

protege and spokesman for New York City's Central Labor Union, told
an incredulous Senate Committee in 1883 that the single tax did not
necessarily envision the resurrection of the independent producer.
"Independence" of a different sort, he asserted, would come from a
labor market favoring higher wages.

"Wages as such are not objection

able; it is the amount of the wages that workingmen object t o . " ^
Such an application of land reform to the level of wages was a pre
dictable revision of ideology, but obviously represented a dilution
of the original safety valve vision.

Nevertheless, it did address
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the usual concern with the status, condition and independence of
the worker.
The single tax movement quickly grew beyond George himself.
After his encouraging second-place finish in the 1886 New York City
mayoralty election, George's followers formed a permanent New York
United Labor Party in 1887.

Also in 1887, the movement acquired

support from grassroots "Land and Labor Clubs," its single tax

title i a weekly journal, and a diverse following.

With Father

Edward McGlynn, a Catholic priest excommunicated for his single

tax beliefs, George also formed the Anti-Poverty Society.

The

object of the Society was, according to its platform of principles

to spread, by such peaceful and lawful means as may be
found most desirable and efficient, a knowledge of the
truth that God has made ample provision for all men during
their residence upon earth, and that involuntary poverty
is the result of the human laws that allow individuals to
claim as private property that which the Creator has
provided for the use of all.^2
The Anti-Poverty Society, despite its lofty principles, proved
ephemeral.

A series of schisms over ideology squeezed out the

socialist contingent and, in 1888, George himself from the Society
and the United Labor Party.^3

Both organizations survived a few

more years and adhered religiously to George's doctrines.
The United Labor Party in fact ran a candidate in the 1888
presidential election on a platform reminiscent of George's personal
campaign of 1886.

The platform rested on the familiar principle of

man's right to "the use of the common bounties of nature," and also
included

(unlike George's campaign) strong allusions to the safety

valve of the public lands.

"We see access to farming denied to labor,"

the Party resolved, "except on payment of exorbitant rent or acceptance
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of mortgage burdens, and labor, thus forbidden to employ itself,
driven into the

c i t i e s .

"54

The statement was a logical application

of the single tax principle to traditional land reform

rhetoric.

In the course of the campaign, the United Labor Party attempted to
merge with a more traditional Chicago-based farmer and labor party
(which espoused a full slate of political, economic and social
reforms in the interest of "the wealth-producers"), but the latter
declined to join on a single tax

p l a t f o r m .

55

parties fared poorly outside their areas of

In the election, both
o r i g i n .

56

The United

Labor Party of New York expired soon afterwards, but the single tax
movement gained strength in intellectual circles and in local reform
movements.
The campaign that spawned the single tax movement warrants
special consideration, since it indicated the attractiveness of Henry
George to New York City wage-earners.

George accepted the candidacy

for mayor late in September, 1886 after a petition drive garnered
36,000 signatures.

The platform and the party were clearly emanations

of George's philosophy (applied Lo urban property), but the campaign
was more of a mass rally against privilege and monopoly.
the movement frightened propertied interests.

Naturally,

The New York Times

denied, however, that George's candidacy posed a threat to property.
Its editorials commented that even should George win, he would be
powerless to implement his reforms.

The paper also stated, with

probable accuracy, that workingmen were ignorant of his theories.5^
George's candidacy was largely symbolic for New York's workingmen,
not theoretical.

It attracted all elements of dissidents, reform and

labor groups, and even involved the usually non-ideological, apolitical
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Samuel Gompers in the party organization.

"Political action had no

appeal for me," Gompers wrote in his autobiography, "but I appreci
ated the movement as a demonstration of protest."58
Workers accepted George as a symbol of protest against their
capitalist nemesis and, in the process, misrepresented a canon of
George's philosophy.

He stated explicitly in Progress and Poverty

that "the antagonism of interest is not between labor and capital,
as is popularly believed, but is in reality between labor and capi
tal on one side and land ownership on the other ... . ."59

Workers

clearly did not perceive the distinction between capitalist and
landowner; the value of his ideas was symbolic.

He explained

logically, and not only to workers, why inequality was so pervasive
and, more germane to this thesis, why the land question was signifi
cant for labor.

Ill
There was an obvious consistency in the rationalizations of
land's relevance for workers.

The inaccessibility of labor's natural

opportunities on the land was a forecast and an explanation of the
wage-earner's unsatisfactory wages and condition.

Although the

necessity of emigration was superfluous in these rationalizations
(and often a liability), labor spokesmen occasionally addressed
the feasibility and means of emigration.
When labor spokesmen encouraged emigration, they were con
cerned with more than an emergency outlet from overstocked labor
markets or pestilent cities.

Migration represented an exercise of

freedom, taking advantage of natural opportunity, or was a means
of establishing a co-operative society of independent producers.
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Significantly, labor reformers throughout the era recognized the
impediments to active emigration.

Not only did land monopoly

render the public domain inaccessible to most workers, but also
many workers did not wish to leave their occupations for a life
on the soil.

Because of this, the encouragement of emigration--

the active element in the operation of the safety valve--usually
included an appeal for government aid.
The frequency with which demands for government aid accom
panied the encouragement of emigration supports historian Clarence
Danhof's research on the prohibitive costs of migration.

Perhaps

more importantly, it represented a compromise of the free migration
assumption inherent in political economic thought and American tradi
tion.

From labor's perspective, this compromise was not difficult

to justify.

Land monopoly, fostered in part by public land policy,

hindered free migration.

Appeals for assistance did not, therefore,

represent labor's surrender to omnipotent monopoly;

they were

demands for equity and the restoration to labor what naturally
belonged to it.

This tendency could be seen in the resolutions of

William Sylvis and Terence Powderly before their respective organiza
tions.

Sylvis prefaced his 1868 demand for $25 million for assistance

to emigration and other programs to benefit labor with a synopsis
of Congressional generosity to "the special benefit of railroads
and other monopolies . . ."60

Powderly's 1885 demand for congressional

aid was likewise founded on the past generosity to corporations, and
on the belief that, in the future, "the duty of the government must
be to build up and guard the interests of the common people.
Powderly was also haunted by the fear that workingmen would
not emigrate if given the opportunity, or would prove incapable of
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being successful farmers.

On several occasions, he sought to

assuage his own doubts by declaring that government assistance
would ferret out those workers who would and could become success
ful farmers:
I have heard it said that if land was offered to men who
live in large cities they would not avail themselves of
the opportunity to go upon it and make homes for them
selves.
I admit the truth of the assertion, and go a
step further and say it would do them no good to go upon
it unless they had some assurance of succeeding.
The
majority of men who live in large cities are not adapted
to the life which a farmer must lead, and the minority,
no matter how well adapted they may be to such a life,
may be lacking in the experience necessary to the success
ful operation of the farm. But whether experienced or
not, if the most careful, thrifty man be placed on the
farm, admitting that the land, dwelling, barn and out
houses are given to him free of charge, if he is lacking
in the capital necessary to defray the cost of implements,
seed and stock, he will fail unless help is extended to him
in this direction also . . . . There are in all of our
large cities and towns a number of men and families who
would make excellent farmers if they were provided with
sufficient means to give them a start in agricultural
life, but they are deficient in means, and they must
remain to compete with others in our crowded centers in
the race for life.62
Powderly's doubts were not unique.

Edward Peters’ program for

"artisan homesteads" took into consideration the reluctance of workers
to become farmers.

Most labor reformers however, maintained that

many workers (enough to balance the labor markets) would take ad
vantage of their birthright if given free opportunity or the assis
tance to do so.
The most explicit confessions that workingmen could not
afford to emigrate came in the shadow of the 1873-79 depression.

The

International Workingman's Association (the American affiliate of
the First International) sent a memorial to sympathetic Congressman
Benjamin F. Butler in December 1873, urging support of a doomed bill
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giving emigrating workmen free transportation and one year's subsis
tence.

The IWA stressed the benefits of such a scheme to the national

wealth, as well as for the "starving, homeless citizens."63

in 1877-

78, Butler was among three Representatives who presented bills to
the House for assisting workingmen to the public domain.

While

Butler proposed an elaborate plan for the establishment of military
settlements on the frontier, another Civil War political general,
Nathaniel P. Banks, proposed the establishment of a government funded
private corporation to assist emigrants.

Both bills failed to garner

substantial s upport.^
The third bill was the brainchild of Pennsylvania DemocratGreenbacker Hendrick B. Wright.

Before its eventual defeat in

1879, Wright's "plan for permanent relief" of the workers was in
the public arena for two years and stirred widespread agitation
for government assisted emigration.65

The bill proposed $500

Treasury loans to families with property valued at less than $300
who wished to take up a homestead.

The loan, to be repaid at 3

percent interest over ten years, would secure the emigrant's owner
ship of the property.

According to Wright's scheme, the Treasury

would appropriate up to $10 million in this manner.

From 1877 to

1879 Wright flooded the House with memorials of support from major
cities, labor organizations and state legislatures.
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In addition to Wright's personal lobbying effort, represent
atives from several labor organizations and political parties embraced
the scheme in word and spirit before the House Select Committee
investigating the depression.

Unlike Wright's own rhetoric, which

was consciously moderate and "respectful,"68 labor spokesmen made
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belligerent appeals for equity.

Anticipating modern historical

research, Peter Logan, "a representative of the working classes,"
told the Select Committee:
Now you have a homestead law today, but what use is it?
. . . We can't go to the land , nor we can't get any
place where the government land is, without having the
means to go there.
If the government desires the pros
perity of the country it will appropriate a certain
amount in order to bring out the working classes of the
country and settle them on the land.69
The Workingmen's Industrial Association, in asking for $100 million
for emigration of surplus labor, commented:

"As we created all the

wealth you can boast of, you would only be giving us our own.
These reassertions of labor's rights should not obscure the
probable source of agitation for this bill; the depression created
genuine desperation in the ranks of labor and among the urban
poor.

Indeed, only as a depression relief measure could this bill

have drawn such support from workers ordinarily opposed to emigration.
The spectre of starvation and pauperism obviously subordinated
demands for the reconstruction of society according to a natural
order to the necessity of finding immediate relief.

This realiza

tion brought workers, philanthropists and conservative urbanites
into a rare consensus on the utility of a safety valve.

More

significant for historians was the association of a depression relief
safety valve and appeals for assistance.

Nineteenth century observers

noted the opportunity offered by free land in hard times, but obvious
ly found it unrealistic.
Although the depression experience planted seeds of skepticism
over the feasibility of emigration, there were later manifestations of
desire to colonize workingmen on the land.

The most notable of these
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rose from the ideal of a co-operative social order.

One ostensible

principle of the Knights of Labor was an "industrial reorganization
which contemplate[d]

placing land and machinery in the hands of

the workers, to be used for their own benefit and not for capital
ists."^

Acting on this principle, an unauthorized colony, the

York Society of Integral Co-operators, was established in Missouri
in 1883.

Although the Knights espoused the merits of co-operative

colonization, the Executive Board in 1884 reprimanded the founders
of this ill-fated "propagandist styled" colony.

Echoing the under

current of skepticism over the feasibility of colonization, the
Board concluded from the fiasco "that in establishing our co-opera
tive institutions we must not forget that men reared under the con
dition of wage service cannot jump at once to the much higher level
of co-operation."72
Co-operative colonization was the focus of a later emigration
scheme, developed by Socialist Party founder Eugene V. Debs.

Reacting

to the depression of the 1890s, Debs formulated a program of establish
ing Social Commonwealth colonies on the western lands.

The plan

infected the Social Democracy in 1898, precipitating a split in the
party ranks.
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As late as 1908, the Socialist Party adopted a plat

form plank calling for the reservation of public lands for model
state farms and other forms of "collective agricultural enterprises."
The 1910 platform repudiated this demand, and banished the last
trace of the safety valve from the Socialist p r o g r a m . ^

IV
Thus, while emigration or colonization was an attractive
theoretical alternative, it proved singularly impractical as a tool

for labor reform, even as an emergency outlet.

Since the monopoliza

tion of the land was the key to labor's interest in the land question,
the inaccessibility of the land was a logical corollary to the
ideological basis of the safety valve.

The discovery of the feeble

ness of free migration no doubt compounded the urgency of the land
question, but its roots were in the ideological explanations of
land and labor.

The status of the public domain in fact was a

rationalization for the problems facing workmen; the failure of
actual emigration vindicated the theoretical links between land
monopoly and the oppression of labor.
It is, unfortunately, a moot point whether the degradation
of American labor and an open, accessible domain could have co-existed.
As it was, the coincidence of land monopoly and a dissatisfied
working class generated a safety valve vision that found in it
more than coincidence.

Because adherents to the vision accepted

at least the partial closure of land to workers, the uselessness of
emigration was only to be expected.

The real importance of the

vision was its view of how American society had deviated from the
natural order and the consequences flowing from this disparity.
The influence of these perceptions on the temper of American
labor was ambiguous.

On the one hand, by making aggregated capital

a scapegoat for the inaccessibility of land

(among other problems),

the labor safety valve vision exacerbated social tension.

This

hypothesis of course runs against the concept of the safety valve
as a pacifier of labor.

On the other hand, the ideology with which

the safety valve was associated assumed that the natural conditions
in the United States favored labor.

If monopoly and other unnatural

impediments could be removed, the safety valve and other assumed

forces would operate to assure labor its natural rights.

This

ideology steered labor towards reforming the system in the image
of an ideal free society, rather than towards its overthrow.
Thus, it seems that belief in a safety valve led to an activist,
but not a revolutionary working class.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SAFETY VALVE AND THE IDEOLOGY OF MOBILITY

The impotence of the safety valve was also of great concern
to eastern conservatives who attempted to cope with a myriad of
challenges to America’s revered ’’open" society.

Few easterners

denied that the safety valve was not functioning properly, but
there was no consensus among economists, business spokesmen,
charity officials and other

urban interests on the implications

of the ineffective safety valve.

Although conservative organs did

join at least rhetorically the popular appeal for reform of public
land policy,1 the typical response to the ineffective safety valve
was to endeavor to restore or even replace it.

Since the circum

scription of opportunity represented by the impotent safety valve
did not impact directly upon eastern conservatives as it did on
the labor force, conservatives did not accept the exigency of funda
mental social or economic reform.

Instead, the conservative response

was dictated by a concern with the closed safety valve's visible
effect on urban life, and the consequent implications for open society.
The mobility of its society was perhaps the most fundamental
self-perception of nineteenth century America.

It derived its

strength from the contrast with the Old World, and was reinforced
by the belief that America had all the attributes required by a free
society.

The political economist Francis Bowen articulated this
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assumed truism in an 1856 treatise in which he applied the laws of
classical economics to the United States.

Bowen repudiated the

theoretical association of wage level and population, declaring
that if England offered alternatives for self-employment to its
wage-earners, as America did, population control would not be
necessary for higher wages.

The standard for American labor was

that of the independent laborer and the small capitalist, Bowen
asserted.

Men used wage work to accumulate capital and to pave

the road to self-sufficiency.

"If nothing better can be done,"

he wrote, "there is always the resource of removing to the West,
and becoming a pioneer in the settlement of government lands."2
America's "mobility ideology"^ of course transcended the
opportunity represented by free land.

This larger ideology dic

tated the contours of the conservative safety valve vision.

A

paramount presupposition was that the abundant opportunity under
lying a mobile society should not benefit all persons.

Opportunity

was a selective process that rewarded only the virtuous and indus
trious.

There was no greater sin against individual character or

society than indiscriminate charity.

Free land, therefore, was

available only at the expense of hard work and thrift.

For this

reason, the profoundly conservative New York Association for Improv
ing the Condition of the Poor rejected assisted emigration for re
lieving the victims of the 1870s depression, since the West did not
want the "chaff" of the East.^
A related assumption underlying the safety valve, derived
from the belief that the industrious American could accumulate
significant capital, was that the destitute could not emigrate to
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the West.

Mustering sufficient financial resources was an acid

test of character.

Horace Greeley warned in 1859 that without

"liberal means," or $5,000, the settler would have to endure four
to five years of self-denial to succeed in the

West.5

After the

Homestead Act made land free of cost, western boosters continued
to discourage the physically, morally or financially unprepared from
emigrating.

An 1882 booster recommended that, with the utmost

thrift, a man needed at least $500 ($1,000 if he had a family),
\

along with youth, health, industry and determination to make a
living.^
There were other connections between the mobility ideology
and the safety valve of free land.

Land, as the fundamental element

of production, lay at the heart of America's wealth and unbridled
opportunity for its citizens.

The ability to continue expanding

westward was crucial to the expansion or preservation of opportunity.
Expansion and the affording of opportunity to industrious settlers
were mutually reinforcing processes which effected growth, production,
consumption, and, hence, more wealth.

Free land facilitated the

geographic and occupational circulation of labor, which classical
economists deemed so crucial to harmony and prosperity.

From these

hypotheses, it became apparent that the safety valve was an assump
tion of economic theory and, therefore, an indispensable element in
the ideology of the existing socio-economic order.

Not surprisingly,

eastern conservatives found the safety valve theory difficult to re
pudiate, even when circumstances clearly revealed its ineffectiveness.
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I
F r o m the conservative perspective,

the safety valve was a

natural law which linked workers with available opportunities.

Un

like labor reformers, conservatives generally made the distinction
between the safety valve as a mechanism of distribution and as a
synonym of opportunity itself.

This carefully-tailored conception

of a safety valve allowed a continued faith in the existence of
opportunity, even while acknowledging the lack of mobility.

Such

a distinction became imperative when urbanites tried to cope with
what appeared to be the symptoms of a "settled" society.

Eastern

cities were the most sensitive barometers for mobility and suffered
the worst from its stultification.

The subtle change in urban

attitudes towards poverty, and the explicit recognition of chronic
population pressures,

indicated that either opportunity was in

short supply or something obstructed the pursuit of opportunity.

Observers noted a plethora of sources for the stagnation
of urban population, and persistently urged that available opportuni
ties be seized upon.

The New York Times incessantly deprecated

immigrants and migrant workers for lingering in the city, and the
city charities for not encouraging or compelling the idle to go to
western or southern lands.

"Let not another season go by," urged

an 1861 editorial, "in which we have neglected the natural remedy
Providence has afforded to this country for pauperism and the idle
ness of the able bodied and strong h a n d e d . T h e

editors of the

Times felt that the burden of urban population could only be removed
by facilitating the "natural flow" of migration.

Other urban news

papers shared this conviction, and co-operated with state governments
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and land companies to promote western o p p o r t u n i t e s S i m i l a r l y ,

the

business organ, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle tempered its
enthusiasm for immigration with the caveat that immigrants must not
congregate--as they did— in cities.

It advised immigrants in 1865

to "shake from your feet the dust of our great cities the moment
you arrive, and without hesitation, without delay go westward or
southward and invest what you have in broad acres of good land."^
For the next half-century, the Chronicle considered proper distribu
tion of immigrants a necessary concomitant to unrestricted immigration.
Efforts to facilitate the natural flow of population in fact consti
tuted the chief conservative reaction to the impotent safety valve.
Complicating the interruption of the natural flow of popula
tion to opportunities on the land (or simply away from the cities)
was the "reverse" migration from country to city.

As early as 1875,

the editors of Scribner1s Monthly noted that not only was agricultural
life anathema to city dwellers, but also the "social starvation" of
country life drove rural dwellers to the cities.

Reverse migration

was, the editors warned, "one of the greatest evils of the time . . . "
and could only be cured by removing the stigma of rural blandness
and extolling the virtues of "independent" farm l i f e . ^

This remedy

of course anticipated the back-to-the-land movement with which later
efforts to force open the safety valve were allied.

Rural refugees

exacerbated the population pressures of immigration and accentuated
the existence of a class of permanent poor.

Although the reactions

taken as a result of these conditions were, as will be seen, rather
homogeneous, there was a diversity of opinion on their implications.
In one camp of opinion were the stalwart conservatives who
maintained not only the existence of opportunity, but also of an
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operative law of distribution.

As William Graham Sumner told the

House Select Committee investigating the 1870s depression, "common
sense and right reason," not assistance or conscious distribution
would take men to the l a n d . ^

More importantly, conservatives

argued that the reality of a poor class did not invalidate natural
economic law.

Economic theory allowed for a certain measure of

suffering, whether a result of individual indolence or economic
slump.

In the latter instance, the industrious poor--although

blocked from migrating during the worst Of times— would be able to
weather the storm and emigrate when the situation improved.12

Con

servatives advised that the appearance of a closed safety valve was
deceiving.

During the depression of 1890s, the editor of Review

of Reviews, Albert Shaw, wrote that, in the United States:
despite all assertions to the contrary, there is generally
work enough for everybody who is willing to work, at wages
which the proper economy will enable the worker to lay
aside something for a rainy day.
The operation of natural
economic laws will tend to draw a part of the temporarily
congested population of the towns back to the land, and
out to the newer parts of the country, where there is
still room for millions of people, and a fair chance by
hard work and frugal living to secure a livelihood.13
Edward Atkinson, the spokesman of the New England textile industry,
concurred with Shaw.
and Labor:

He told the 1883 Senate Committee on Education

"If men are poor to-day in this land, it is either be

cause they are incapable of doing the work which is waiting to be
done or are unwilling to accept the conditions of w o r k . T h u s ,
the failure of the safety valve and other mechanisms for insuring
free mobility owed to the workers’ resistance to economic laws.
Opposing this retained faith in the economic system was an
evolving awareness of a distinction between poverty and pauperism.
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This awareness had its genesis in the recognition that the economic
system victimized otherwise virtuous individuals.

Chronic depression,

declining real wages, and the scientific and statistical study of
the poor led to the "discovery11 of unemployment as a phenomenon
distinct from idleness.^

In other words, the assumption that

failure indicated personal flaws was not always true.

Professor

J. J. McCook reflected this revised philosophy when he suggested
to the 1895 National Conference on Social Welfare that the best
remedy to the tramp problem (traditionally associated with individ
ual vice) was to "abolish industrial booms, financial crises,
business slumps

and

hard times."

16

Significantly, the recognition

of involuntary poverty did not alter the attitude toward indiscrimi
nate charity.

Adherents to this new gospel of poverty in fact tried

to reinforce traditional values and facilitate mobility by fostering
conditions conducive to remunerative virtue.
The new awareness generated attempts to recreate the benefits
of a freely operative safety valve.

These efforts blended smoothly

with a universal concern with distributing surplus labor to available
opportunities.

Although the many manifestations of this remedy had

a common respect for the traditional assumptions of mobility, they
emanated from different motivations.

Many advocates of distribution

sought merely to rid the cities of surplus population and thus remove
the "blight" from sight and conscience.

Others felt that distribution

was necessary to compensate for the unwillingness of laborers to leave
city attractions and access to charity for the hard, but rewarding
life on the land.

There was also a notable decline from the traditional

safety valve emphasis on free land; distribution often took the form
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of labor exchanges.

This was a logical reaction to the proven in

accessibility of western land, and an outgrowth of the conservative
perspective's emphasis on opportunity in general.

All these mani

festations reflected the conviction that urban crowding and poverty
were symptoms of a stagnant society antithetical to America's free
and open ideal.

Whether distribution could carry the ideological

burden placed on the safety valve was not certain.

Clearly,

distribution was an exigency, a substitution for an ineffective
natural mechanism.
Distribution schemes tried to synthesize the natural selec
tiveness attributed to free opportunity.

For the sake of the host

destination and for the people of good character, schemes stressed
the necessity of assisting only the worthy.

Advocates comforted

themselves with the belief that this was possible because the truly
indolent would not leave the city under any circumstances.

The

most genuinely philanthropic schemes were formulated by New York City
citizens in the 1860s and 1870s.

The model for emulation was the

Children's Aid Society, which began assisting well-conducted orphans
to farmers' homes in the 1 8 5 0 s . ^

^he Citizens' Association of New

York, led by the wealthy friend of labor, Peter Cooper, corresponded
with western Governors in 1868-69 to arrange assistance for the
migration of worthy poor to western l a n d s . ^

The Citizens' Associa

tion, and a similar effort a decade later, the Co-operative Colony
Aid Association, expired without substantive achievement.

The

Colony Aid Association, however, drafted an ambitious plan to solicit
loans for the establishment of colonies of unemployed on western
lands.

The Association acknowledged in its constitution the existence
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of a poor class independent of business depression, and tried to
sell itself as an investment in the employment

of idle industry

.^

These schemes for outright assistance suffered from the same cul
tural antipathy that frustrated others proposed by representatives
of labor.

Although these schemes were virtually unique in their
empathy with the laboring poor, the emphasis on traditional values,
and on the exigency of colonization (as opposed to the isolation
and tenuousness of individual settlement) reappeared in later pro
posals.

Francis Peabody wrote in Forum in 1894 of the need for

colonies for the poor during depressed times.

Citing the intoler

able "evil" of idleness, he urged that farm colonies were best
suited for inculcating appreciation of work.20

The Salvation Army

employed similar reasoning in its ultimately unsuccessful effort
to establish farming communities for the unemployed at the turn
of the century.21

A curious offshoot of the association of land

with virtue and opportunity was the "garden plot" movement of the
1890s.

Several cities, initially Detroit, selected a handful of

unemployed workers to cultivate vacant city lots in an effort to
give them remunerative employment and foster an appreciation for
rural

i n d e p e n d e n c e

.22

These programs and proposals were similar in

intent to public works programs, but were less controversial because
they carried the overtones of being substitutes for "natural remedies,"
not imitations of European "socialism."
The worsening urban conditions and continued

failure of

population to move to the country convinced some easterners that
more drastic measures were required.

The New York Charity Organization
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Society led a sustained struggle for mandatory colonization of the
idle in rural

a r e a s .

23

gUch a demand originated of course in the

belief that the poor themselves, not the economic system were
responsible for idleness.

The appeal for active distribution of

immigrants or the unemployed continued well into the twentieth cen
tury.

It illustrated the stubborn belief that opportunity had not

disappeared and that society, despite the illusions of stagnation,
was still open.

The failure of the safety valve did not occasion

an immediate surrender of these assumptions.
Confidence in distribution, though, was not without critics.
Walter Weyl, later an editor of the New Republic, told the 1905
National Conference on Social Welfare that faith in distribution
was self-deluding.

The failure of free migration and mobility

could not be compensated; immigrants as well as rural dwellers flowed
into the cities without regard for natural laws.

Weyl's pessimism

and his consequent call for restriction of immigration rested on
his adherence to a notion that had gained wide currency in the pre
ceding decades.

"We have struck our frontier," he warned.

The western wave of migration has reached its limit, and
the population has been obliged to recoil upon itself.
From now on there will be no outlet for the unemployed
and the discontented of our cities. The conditions of
life will tend to become more and more similar to those
in western Europe.24
The same mentality of course had prompted Frederick Jackson Turner
to declare the frontier closed a dozen years before.

In conjunction

with events that challenged assumptions of opportunity, the closed
frontier mentality caused fundamental changes in the perceptions of
American society.

This revisionism by no means supplanted all faith
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in natural laws, but it clearly relegated the assumption of a
safety valve of free land to the past tense.

II
By the end of the nineteenth century, America's equation of
the West with opportunity had become tenuous.

Since the 1870s the

visible shrinkage of the unappropriated arable lands had cast a
shadow over the future, if not the present prospects of migration.
Of more immediate impact were the upwellings of discontent that
transformed the eastern image of the West from virgin land to
hotbed of radicalism.

The post-war agricultural depression and

discontent culminating in the Populist Movement illustrated that
farming in the West was not necessarily a remunerative living.

In

addition, the cross-country march of "Coxey's Army" of unemployed
wage-earners in 1894 destroyed the myth that the West was exempt
from industrial depression.^5
The eclipse of western opportunity exemplified by the exhausted
public domain carried as much significance for the East as for the
image of the West.

Those easterners who were strongly committed

to free land as an irreplaceable element in the mobility ideology
saw in its passing the necessary revision of the ideology.

One

obvious example of this was the invoking of closed frontier rhetoric
in the push for immigration restriction.

The availability of free

land was usually peripheral to other concerns in the restrictionist
debate.

Nevertheless, because the nation's capacity to absorb limit

less immigrants was thought to be contingent upon an undeveloped
West, the question of free land invariably crept into restriction
debates.

Opponents of free immigration found

the closed frontier
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a convenient rationalization.

Arch-restrictionist Henry Cabot

Lodge, for example, wrote in 1891 that restriction was essential
because:
£w]e no longer have endless tracts of fertile land crying
for settlement . . . . The conditions have changed utterly
from the days when the supply of vacant land was indefinite,
the demand for labor almost unbounded, and the supply of
people very limited.26
Advocates of free immigration found it necessary to refute these
rationalizations.

Laissez-faire stalwart Edward Atkinson wrote in

1892 that opportunity was not as circumscribed as it appeared.
There was, he asserted, "incalculable room for immigrants" on the
public domain; simply because good homestead land was scarce did
not preclude the industrious immigrant from buying farms from
railroads or other private land holders.27
Many of Atkinson's peers dissented from his casual dismissal
of the closed public domain.

Its impact, they asserted, would be

felt most noticeably in the ranks of labor.

Liberal economist David

Ames Wells, writing in 1877, considered the imminent exhaustion of
free land.

Combined with labor-saving machinery, the passing of

free land would steal from workers the opportunity to make themselves
small capitalists.

This opportunity of course had been the premise

of Francis Bowen's mid-century optimism.

The exhaustion of the

domain, Wells concluded, would bring the United States a new social
order resembling that of the Old World, "in which the tendency for a
man born a laborer, working for hire, to never be anything but a
laborer."2®

Similarly, Francis A. Walker, who wrote in his Political

Economy of the necessity of a mobile labor force for economic prosper
ity, offered a gloomy assessment of conditions in 1896.

The
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coincidence of agricultural depression, mass immigration of "beaten
races," and a closed frontier threatened the security of American
labor, and, therefore, economic stability.

"No longer is it a

matter of course," Walker concluded in a startling revision of
economic doctrine, "that every industrious and temperate man can
find work in the United States."29
A closed frontier would cause the United States to stagnate
in other ways.

The check placed upon territorial and commercial

expansion represented by a closed frontier would subvert another
key link between free land and economic stability.

For many east

erners, the modus operandi of the safety valve was the opening of
new markets by the producer-settler.

The industrial journal Age of

Steel, for instance, dubbed the West an "outlet for idle people,
for the surplus capital, the machinery, manufactures, and surplus
products of the looms and shops of our region."^0

Many observers

felt that this assumed mechanism had malfunctioned before the closing
of the domain, and this development only generated a deeper pessimism.
Historians, including Frederick Jackson Turner, have noted
the ramifications of a closed frontier on the role of the government,
especially as it pertained to implementation of an aggressive foreign
policy.xhe

existence of this seemingly insurmountable obstruction

to expansion implied far more than the buildup of the "energies of
expansion" Turner noted.

Senator John A. Kasson, who had earlier

sponsored land reform legislation, articulated the contemporary view
on the economic consequences of a closed frontier:
Our surplus will roll back from the Atlantic Coast upon the
interior and the wheels of prosperity will be clogged of
the very richness of the burden which they carry, but cannot
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deliver . . . . We are rapidly utilizing the whole of
our continental territory. We must turn our eyes
abroad, or they will soon look inward with discontent.32
C. Wood Davis, an observer of western agriculture, formulated
the most comprehensive and apocalyptic vision of a closed frontier
economy in a series of articles in the 1890s.

He foresaw the

necessity of importing foodstuffs, or the tempering of extravagant
American lifestyles because of a neo-Maithusian calculus of in
creasing population and a finite supply of arable land.^3

in addition,

the halt to American expansion, coupled with the new rivalry of
European machine-producing nations, would necessitate the penetration
of new commercial markets.

The same halt to expansion signaled

the choking of "an existing safety valve in the arable public domain"
which had heretofore prevented a dearth of employment opportunities.3^
The closing of the safety valve would increase the pressures created
by labor-saving devices, stagnate individual enterprise, foster a
few personal fortunes, and possibly require a Europeanized militaristic
state to avert a n a r c h i s m . D a v i s ’ assessment was not, however uni
versally pessimistic.

These same limits to expansion would improve

the economic standing of the American farmer (by preventing overpro
duction and making his products more dear), make him a more regular
consumer of industrial goods, and thus mitigate the impact of machineOf:

induced unemployment.

Ill
Despite his innovative approach to the dilemma, Davis's views
were consistent with the thinking of his predecessors and his con
temporaries on the general implications of a closed frontier.

Because

of the absence of free land, and the development of urban-industrial
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society, America would grow to resemble the Old World.

Signifi

cantly, Davis' description of these consequences resembled strongly
the warnings of land and labor reformers who pondered the ineffective
safety valve.

This consistency underscored the similarity of opin-

ions--regardless of varied assumptions on the nature of the safety
valve— on the role of free land.
Even those who retained confidence in the openness of
American society and insisted that the safety valve was only a
replaceable link to available opportunity, could not ignore the
physical features of a settled society.

Not coincidentally, the

notion of a closed or less fluid society also commanded serious
attention by 1900.

In this sense, the perceived validity of a safe

ty valve passed with the establishment of a "crystallized" society.
This truism points to the subtle error of Frederick Jackson Turner
in his concept of a safety valve as an outlet from a settled society.
Obviously, contemporaries considered it an element of an open society
which served to preserve the outlet of opportunity;
and a safety valve were incompatible.

settled society
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CONCLUSION
THE NEW AMERICAN CALCULUS

The existence of a safety valve was, above all, a fundamental
assumption in nineteenth century America.

It was synonymous with

fluidity, opportunity, harmony, and prosperity, qualities on which
the young republic prided itself.

The vast public domain, even

without its economic and ideological connotations, encouraged a
confidence in freedom and openness.

This innate confidence blended

smoothly with a natural rights tradition, and with classical economics
to flesh out the contemporary vision of a safety valve.

Natural

rights theory and classical economic thought were firmly entrenched
in the American credo, and thus reinforced faith in the existence
of a safety valve.

Significantly, the most optimistic appraisals

of the safety valve, presented by Francis Bowen and William Graham
Sumner, outlined a future of unlimited opportunity for Americans.
It was entirely likely that most Americans considered the safety
valve a valid assumption until the "closed frontier" era.

But,

if the adage that institutions only attract attention when they
break down is accepted, the safety valve assumption was a tenuous
one throughout the nineteenth century.
As argued throughout this thesis, the persistent malfunction
ing of the safety valve did not impel contemporaries to abandon faith
in its inherent validity.

Because its effectiveness depended upon
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the existence of normal or "natural" circumstances, its ineffective
ness was easily blamed upon "unnatural," and, hence, ephemeral
conditions.

The criteria for abnormal conditions varied according

to perspective:

monopoly for land and labor reformers, a malevolent

economic system for urban liberals, a simple violation of economic
laws for conservatives.

Regardless of perspective, there was a

consensus on the reality of social maladies resulting from a faulty
natural mechanism.

Henry George, although a partisan of labor,

articulated the ideological consensus when he wrote that social
evils "spring solely from social maladjustments which ignore natural
laws, and that in removing their causes we shall be giving an enormous
impetus to progress."*Advocates of any of the safety valve strains could not
subsist forever on discredited assumptions.

They were not hesitant

to admit that fundamental problems existed in American society, or
to prophecize an even more gloomy future.

Indeed, for reformers,

warning of the consequences of an inaccessible or exhausted public
domain was a potent weapon.

In particular, summoning the lessons

of Ancient Rome or contemporary Europe served to heighten the sense
of crisis in American society.

The safety valve assumption, as a

significant point of contrast with the Old World, was a major source
of American identity.

It was, therefore, a sensitive gauge for

social and economic evolution.
These prophecies of American decay antedated the closed
frontier mentality that has been enshrined in historical scholar
ship.

The very concept of a safety valve in fact invited a negative

perspective on its role in American civilization.

The safety valve

110
explained what America was in terms of what it was not; it was not
a long step to explaining the impact of its absence in terms of
what America would become.

George Henry Evans, for instance, associ

ated the inaccessible and unjustly distributed domain with the en
slavement and oppression of workers, and the stultification of
eastern cities.

For Evans, with his 900 year plan for township

democracies, the imminent exhaustion of the public domain was hardly
a major concern.

In short, the descriptions of America without a

safety valve that gained such wide currency at the close of the
nineteenth century were a product of the concept itself, and were
first propagated by the land and labor reformers who perceived not
a permanently closed frontier, but merely an impotent safety valve.
These ideologues in turn bequeathed the vision to the late nineteenth
century intellectual milieu, to the businessmen and urbanites, and
to modern scholars via Frederick Jackson Turner.
The closed frontier mentality did, however, convince many
observers of the painful truth of these prophecies.

The fear of

a closed frontier was not, as many historians have pointed out, a
post-mortem product of the 1890s.

Several Newburyport, Massachusetts

newspapers in the early 1850s predicted virtual class war with the
"imminent" exhaustion of the

domain.2

Most commentators in the

1850s were concerned more with the inaccessibility of the public
land, but certainly, by the 1870s, there was much uneasiness over
America’s immediate future.

This uneasiness owed of course to the

labor agitation, economic troubles and general social malaise of
the post-war decades.

The safety valve, as an intellectual force,

held little importance outside of this context.

All signs in the

late nineteenth century pointed towards fundamental change.

As

lit
Goldwin Smith commented in the wake of the Great Railroad Strike
of 1877:

"the youth of America is over; maturity with its burdens,

its difficulties, its anxieties, has come."

o

The passing of the United States from carefree youth to
troubled maturity was the dominant metaphor used to describe change
in the late 1800s.

Turner described the transition to a "settled"

society; Josiah Strong, Walter Weyl and countless others feared the
Europeanization of the American way of life.

Regardless of

terminol

ogy, all observers who countenanced the notion of a closed frontier
or an impotent safety valve anticipated change.

Land reformers

berated land policy and predicted the eclipse of free institutions;
labor reformers used land monopoly to explain undesirable changes;
immigration restrictionists and commercial expansionists cited
the closed frontier to rationalize change.

The United States, so

long sheltered from the grim realities of the modern world, would
have to turn and meet the enemy.

America not only had grown to

resemble the Old World, but would also have to act like the Old World.
In the twentieth century, the existence of the inoperative
safety valve and a closed frontier has become a veritable truism.
Historians, journalists and even policy-makers cite the transitions
of a closed frontier era to explain or justify change.

A commentator

in 1914 wrote that America had become subject to the laws of "dimin
ishing return."^

Frontier historian Frederic Paxson wrote in 1930

that the passing of the public lands meant that industrialism had
caught up with the United States.^

More interesting, and perhaps

more significant, have been the continuing resurrections of the
safety valve in government policy.

The effort to compensate for the

loss of the frontier and the safety valve underscores the dogged
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strength of the safety valve assumption.

Hugh Johnson, Director

of the National Recovery Administration, for example, in order to
rationalize the expanded role of the Federal Government in the
New Deal, cited the effectiveness of a safety valve in relieving
the distress of earlier depressions.6

Statistical evidence and

historical scholarship have been unable to prove or disprove
Johnson's casual statement, but, according to most contemporary
opinions, the safety valve was no more able to relieve distress in
the 1890s than it was in the 1930s.
An even more illustrative example of the safety valve
assumption appeared in a 1919 report prepared for Secretary of
Labor William Wilson.

Wilson harbored plans to use labor and farm

ing opportunities on the public domain to mitigate the impact of
returning veterans on the post-World War I economy.

The report

offered a guarded assessment of the domain's capacity to fulfill
such a role, and accounted for the recognized difficulties of
unassisted emigration and farming in the semi-arid West.

"The

problem which the United States now faces," the report urged, "is
to provide for its population opportunities equivalent to, or better
than those at one time afforded by an expanding public domain."7
Similar recommendations, of course, accompanied emigration schemes
as early as the 1860s.

The report, however, left no doubt that

the safety valve was once a free and effective force before the
closing of the frontier:
The existence of unoccupied land acted as an outlet for
whatever pressure excess numbers of population might from
time to time produce.
The evil effects of the panics, 1813,
1837, 1857, and particularly 1873, were minimized by reason
of the uncultivated lands of the West acting as a refuge
to those ruined in business or thrown out of employment.^
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Secretary Wilson and his colleagues shared with nineteenth century
observers a belief that a safety valve should be a real force in
American life.

They also perpetuated a well-established tradition

by attributing the heyday of the freely operative safety valve
to an earlier generation, and making its recovery contingent upon
a new calculus.

NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

^George, Progress, p. 455.
n

^Thernstrom, Poverty, pp. 55-56.
^Quoted in LaFeber, New Empire, p. 16.
^William J. Trimble, "The Influence of the Passing of the
Public Lands," Atlantic Monthly, June 1914, p. 757.
^Frederic L. Paxson, When the West Is Gone (New York:
Holt and Co., 1930), p. 74.

Henry

^Cited in Curtis Nettels, "Frederick Jackson Turner and
the New Deal," Wisconsin Magazine of History 17 (March 1934): 263.
^Leifur Magnusson, Disposition of the Public Lands in the
United States With Particular Reference to Wage-Earning Labor (Washing
ton, D.C.:
GPO, 1919), p. 30.
^Ibid., p. 14.
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